engagement with the target culture will equip the translator with the necessary linguistic and cultural knowledge to produce a dynamically equivalent translation. Nida gives numerous examples of this type of knowledge and its implications, such as the fact that Shilluk, which is spoken in what is now South Sudan, uses the phrase ‘to spit on the ground in front of’ to describe the concept of repentance, referencing the custom of plaintiffs and defendants spitting on the ground in front of each other to indicate closure when a court case has been concluded. In Shilluk, therefore, the metaphor of spitting on the ground would serve as ‘the more meaningful idiom’ for the Biblical concept of repentance (ibid:158).

Nida’s approach has its methodological flaws on a linguistic level: its ‘focus on sentence-level-and-below linguistics’ (Mojola and Wendland 2003:5), for example, and its assumption that we can access source-text meaning (ibid:7), a claim which renders it essentially irreconcilable with a poststructuralist view of language that sees meaning as fluid, created in the interplay between author, reader, text and the wider culture they inhabit. From an ideological standpoint, too, dynamic equivalence has its critics, summed up by Lawrence Venuti’s view that it ‘seeks to impose on English-language readers […] a distinctly Christian understanding of the Bible’ (1995:23), i.e. it does not allow any access to the text that would lie outside the framework of the Christian faith, precluding the reading of ‘sacred’ texts as works of literature or historical sources. But Pym argues that ‘when dealing with the translation of sacred texts, there is a level at which ethical discussion simply has to accept the commitment of the faithful’ (Pym 2012:110), a statement that suggests the devout have privileged access to these texts and to the translation thereof. Like many translators of secular texts, Nida’s commitment to the text and the task at hand is rooted in a belief that the message held by that text is worthwhile and, furthermore, communicable – ‘the writers of the Biblical books expected to be understood’ (Nida and Taber 1974:7) – and that its movement into other cultures and languages should be facilitated. Nida shares Luther’s democratic view of the Bible as a text for the people, a text that must meet people where they stand, in their own language (ibid:31). For Nida, translating in a dynamically equivalent fashion is an act of Christian humanism that provides readers with democratic access to a life-enriching text; for Venuti, and for others, it is ideologically charged, a crude form of cultural colonialism.

Why do we translate? Ideological agendas

It is perfectly natural for the human mind to resist the assault on it of untreated strangeness; therefore cultures have always been inclined to impose complete transformations on other cultures, receiving
Said’s seminal work of postcolonial theory, *Orientalism* (2003 [1978]), examines how the West constructed the East from the late eighteenth century and onwards through the colonial era, and how this image of the ‘Orient’ continues to affect our attitudes towards the Middle East today. Orientalism is an ideology – that is to say, it is a way of looking at the world, or a portion of the world; it is the ‘imposition of a pattern – some form of structure or organization – on how we read (and misread) political facts, events, occurrences, actions, on how we see images and hear voices’ (Freeden 2003:3). Although the term ‘ideology’ dates from the French Revolution – Destutt de Tracy published a book entitled *Projet d’éléments d’idéologie* in 1801 – and was initially concerned with the study of ideas (Destutt de Tracy 2012 [1801]), our contemporary understanding of it is heavily influenced by its Marxist inflection, beginning with Marx and Engels’ *The German Ideology* (written 1845–6 but not published in its entirety until 1932), which sees ideology as an illusory force that works to conceal the material reality of capitalism, upholding the economic and social status quo for the benefit of the ruling class (Marx and Engels 1970). Understood in this sense, ideology can be made visible, and then either deliberately embraced or consciously resisted. From this stems a more everyday usage of the term, which has come to describe the sum of one’s political outlook on society, be it socialist, conservative, liberal or neo-liberal, which in turn informs people’s voting behaviour and political decisions. But ‘ideology’ also has a more abstract, subconscious meaning, as Freeden’s definition implies: as an all permeating force of which we are partly or fully unaware and which colours not only our behaviour but our very perception of the world. This interpretation owes much to Louis Althusser, who, in a merging of Marxist and psychoanalytic theory, suggested that our very sense of self takes shape within an ideological framework and that our tastes, values and desires are acquired through our participation in the ideological practices that structure ordinary life: going to school, attending church, going to work, watching television and reading the newspaper, and fulfilling our ordained role within family structures (Althusser 2014).

No matter which definition of ideology we embrace, it is clear that literary translation, as a human activity taking place in the era of late capitalism, is inevitably ideologically situated. Since translators work within the marketplace – although, as we have already noted, not all literary translation is profit-driven – they are a part of an ideological system (capitalism) that governs their mode of production. In fact, from a Marxist point of view, many of the woes of the profession
Why do we translate?

could be attributed to translation’s dominant mode of production: a translator’s work is almost always owned by somebody else, be it the author, the foreign publisher or the domestic publisher. The translator is inadequately compensated and is often only saved from the fate of alienated labour by those other rewards that Pym has identified (2012:124–5). As a social and economic practice, translation cannot help but serve, to a greater or lesser extent, the ideological ends of the system in which it is situated. Like Orientalism, translation will always convert the foreign from something into something else, to a large extent because the vast majority of translations are commodities, produced for a particular market and sold to generate a profit. But ideology is both a conscious and an unconscious force, and hence can – and, as Venuti has argued, should – be resisted, by individuals and by groups: ‘translators must [. . .] force a revision of the codes – cultural, economic, legal – that marginalize and exploit them’ (Venuti 1995:311).

In this section we will be looking at how ideology affects the politics and ethics of the practice of literary translation in the Anglophone world. What does ideology have to do with our motivations for translating? Those translation theorists who argue that we should not always translate (e.g. Pym 2012), that we should not translate for the ignorant reader (e.g. Scott 2012a) or that we all too easily forget the importance of untranslatability (e.g. Apter 2013) do so because they see the decision to translate – rather than not to translate – as ideologically motivated in itself, having to do with humanist belief in translation as a means, and perhaps the means, to greater understanding between peoples. Both Scott and Pym argue that translation may in fact undermine this goal (Scott 2012a:17; Pym 2012:167).

Since ideology operates both consciously and unconsciously, a translator may be actively and openly in pursuit of a particular ideological agenda, as is the case with overtly feminist translation practices (see von Flotow 1997 for an overview of such practices); be entirely or partially unaware of the ideological forces operating upon him or her – one might argue that Simone de Beauvoir’s first English translator H.M. Parshley falls into this category (Simons 1983; Moi 2002); be aware but powerless or unwilling to resist; or be caught between several camps, functioning as ‘a kind of double agent’ (Tymoczko and Gentzler 2002a:xix). The evidence for ideological motivation may be partially or completely hidden and must therefore be sought in statements made by translators, but also in analyses of translation products (Berman 2012; Toury 1995). And, depending on one’s usage of the term, there are various kinds of ideologies, or at least various levels upon which ideology is operative: at the level of the socio-economic organization of society (capitalism, communism, feudalism); at the level of religion, gender, race or the nation; and at the level of the particular truth claims of systems of knowledge (e.g. psychoanalysis, Marxism, humanism). As we continue to investigate
why we translate, how might potential answers to that question be motivated ideologically? And what might the implications of this be for how we translate?

**Ideology in translation: colonialism**

Translation can serve dominant ideologies – nations, institutions and ideas that already hold power and influence, or weaker and emergent ideologies – constituencies of various kinds seeking empowerment and a stronger voice, or both at the same time. Much valuable research has been done within Translation Studies on how translation intersects with ideology and power (see, for example, Lefevere 1992; Álvarez and Vidal 1996; Tymoczko and Gentzler 2002b; Calzada Pérez 2003; Tymoczko 2010), with particular attention being paid to the role of translation in colonial and postcolonial contexts (see, for example, Niranjana 1992; Tymoczko 1999; Bassnett and Trivedi 1999; Simon and St-Pierre 2000; Batchelor 2009) and how translation can further imperial interests or promote decolonization. Indeed, these topics have been the dominant field of enquiry in Translation Studies since the early 1990s. One straightforward example of how translation can strengthen the hold of empire can be found in the Maori-language translation of the Treaty of Waitangi (1840), by which Great Britain assumed sovereignty over New Zealand. This translation has been shown to be inadequate on a number of levels (Fenton and Moon 2002). Completed by an Anglican missionary, Henry Williams, the translated treaty simplified the complex English text and omitted important details, resulting in a translation that served the needs of the colonizers. Unsurprisingly, debate over the legitimacy of the treaty continues to the present day. Another example of how translation can serve a dominant ideology is Sir Richard Francis Burton’s translation of *Alf Laylah wa-Laylah*, the collection of medieval Arabic stories known to contemporaneous readers of Burton’s version as *The Book of the Thousand Nights and a Night*; this first appeared in 1885, when British colonial activity in the Middle East was particularly intense. There is some doubt as to the originality of Burton’s translation – he has been accused of plagiarizing from John Payne’s earlier translation, published between 1882 and 1884 (Irwin 1994:29) – but the ‘obtrusive and often supernumerary footnotes’ (ibid:32) that accompany Burton’s translation are certainly his own work. In these footnotes, which are ‘fascinating, titillating, digressive, conversational and controversial in tone’ (Sallis 1999:57), Burton occupies a position of authority over the text and over the Middle East. The footnotes include digressions on the sexual habits of Orientals (‘we do not find in The Nights any allusion to that systematic *prolongatio veneris* which is so much cultivated by Moslems under the name Imsâk = retention, withholding *i.e.* the semen’ (1885:76)), on
their customs (‘Easterns as a rule sleep with head and body covered by a sheet or in cold weather a blanket. The practice is doubtless hygienic, defending the body from draughts when the pores are open; but Europeans find it hard to adopt; it seems to stop their breathing’ (ibid:18–19)) and on their religions (‘the strict Moslem is a model Conservative whose exemplar of life dates from the seventh century. This fact may be casuistically explained away; but is not less an obstacle to all progress and it will be one of the principal dangers threatening Al-Islam’ (ibid: 167)). Said argues that although Burton’s writings on the region, including his translations, are born of first-hand experience – Burton spoke fluent Arabic and even completed the pilgrimage to Mecca – his claim to mastery of the Orient through knowledge ‘elevates Burton’s consciousness to a position of supremacy over the Orient’ and in this he as an individual merges with the imperialist project ‘which is itself a system of rules, codes, and concrete epistemological habits’ (Said 2003 [1978]:196). The imperialist, Orientalist claim to knowledge is a means of exerting control from without, a denial of sovereignty and a rejection of cultural fluidity and complexity. The Explanatory Notes on the Manners and Customs of Moslem Men which accompany Burton’s translation confine the Middle East within their expository framework in precisely this fashion. Colonial and neo-imperialist agendas have also been served by translation carried out in the context of missionary activity, which often had secondary effects beyond the immediate goal of evangelization. Israel has looked at the ‘civilizing process’ of religious conversion in nineteenth-century India (2006:453), which helped the British consolidate their hold on the sub-continent, and Carcelen-Estrada, among others (see, for example, Colby and Dennett 1995), has argued that the activities of SIL and other missionary groups in Latin America during the Cold War were ‘an extension of anti-communist controls’ that were very much in the interests of the US (2010:68).

**Ideology in translation: systems of thought**

Translation can not only uphold dominant systems of power such as colonialism and its constitutive ideology, Orientalism, it can also weaken the force of new ideas trying to gain a foothold and prevent more established ideas from developing. Simone de Beauvoir’s seminal work of feminist philosophy *Le deuxième sexe* (1949) and Sigmund Freud’s collected writings on psychoanalysis both have controversial Anglophone translation histories which demonstrate how translation can have ideological effects even where it may be difficult to attribute an overtly ideological intention. De Beauvoir’s work was translated into English by a US zoologist, H.M. Parshley, an expert on human sexual behaviour and reproduction but who had no previous translation experience. *The Second Sex*, as de Beauvoir’s book was titled in
English, was published in the US in 1953 by Knopf. The problems with Parshley’s translation have been well documented by feminist theorists (Simons 1983; von Flotow 2000; Moi 2002). Simons was the first to bring English readers’ attention to the fact that 10 per cent of the text’s original material was missing from the translation, that seventy-eight women’s names, and with them a significant body of women’s history, had been deleted from the text and that philosophical terms related to existentialism, such as Sartre’s *la réalité humaine* (erroneously rendered as ‘the real nature of man’) had been mangled in translation (Simons 1983:563). The latter category of deformity in particular gave the impression that ‘Beauvoir is a sloppy writer, and thinker’ (ibid). Nonetheless, Simons comes to the conclusion that all of this damage to de Beauvoir’s text was unlikely to have been ‘the result of some kind of sexist plot’ (ibid). Moi too stresses that ‘Parshley should not be seen as the villain of the piece’ (2010:5). Parshley was enthusiastic about de Beauvoir’s work and felt quite strongly that it should be translated. But if one cannot attribute intent to undermine de Beauvoir’s pioneering feminist philosophy to the translator, where can or should one attribute blame? Publisher Knopf’s role in editing and promoting *The Second Sex* has been examined by several scholars (Englund 1994; Bogic 2011), who have concluded on the basis of the Parshley–Knopf correspondence that much of the impetus for textual cuts came from the publisher in a drive to simplify the text for the American reader (Bogic 2011:161–2). There was also a failure on Parshley’s part to apprehend the text as a work of philosophy: his preface to the translation states that ‘Mlle de Beauvoir’s book is, after all on woman, not on philosophy’ (Parshley 1997 [1953]:8); his ‘philosophically deaf ear’ (Moi 2002:1014) and ignorance of existentialism were compounded by the publisher’s belief that existentialism was ‘a dead duck’ (Blanche Knopf, cited in Bogic 2011:160). The temporal proximity of Parshley’s translation to de Beauvoir’s text may have exacerbated this myopia. So while there was certainly no ideological ill intent towards de Beauvoir’s text, the failure of the translator to read the book as a philosophical text, the publisher’s preoccupation with sales and its inability to find a translator better suited to the task all combined to undermine *The Second Sex* and its effects as a pioneering work of feminist philosophy. The recent re-translation of the text by Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-Chevallier (2009) has, according to Toril Moi, done nothing to correct this position. Moi describes her experience of reading this new translation as like ‘reading underwater’: ‘it [is] no more reliable, and far less readable than Parshley’ (2010:6).

A further example of how translation can affect systems of knowledge, whether emergent or established, is to be found in the translation of the writings of Sigmund Freud. Until the first decade of this century, Freud’s works were probably best known to English-language readers through the twenty-four-volume Standard Edition, edited by psychoanalyst
James Strachey, who had been one of Freud’s patients, in collaboration with Freud’s daughter, Anna Freud, and translated by Strachey and his wife, Alix, a fellow psychoanalyst, with the assistance of Alan Tyson. Copyright on the Standard Edition is held by the Institute of Psychoanalysis, home of the British Psychoanalytical Society; this is the edition of Freud’s works that the Institute uses in its training programme. The Standard Edition has been critiqued for its ‘formality and would-be accuracy’, which has none of the ‘charm, flexibility, and force of Freud’s Viennese expression’ (Mahony 1987:18), and for its imposition of a standardized terminology reliant on dense scientific neologisms that do not reflect Freud’s more everyday language (Bettelheim 1984 [1982]). When Penguin commissioned new translations of Freud’s work in the early 2000s, interested in ‘how one might make a Freud for the new century’ (Phillips 2007:36), the Institute of Psychoanalysis sent a solicitor’s letter to the managing director of Penguin pointing out that these new translations were not to draw on the Standard Edition (ibid:37). Phillips wittily suggests that, from a psychoanalytic point of view, the Institute cannot have been motivated merely by its stated fear of loss of income from sales of the Standard Edition. Rather, the fears surrounding the re-translation of Freud’s writings have to do with transference (in the psychoanalytic sense):

In producing and promoting and defending the Standard Edition, the institutes of psychoanalysis were not in any way controlling the interpretation of Freud’s texts. I think it is possible, to put it in psychoanalytic language, that there is a wish to control – odd as it might sound – the diversity of personal histories that are brought to bear on Freud’s texts by having a variety of translators, none of whom may have been analysed [...], and many of whom may have different views about Freud’s language. The Standard Edition, whatever else it is, is one man’s transference to Freud’s words, a transference that Freud himself was acquainted with and had, to some extent, analysed; and it was supervised by a committee of senior analysts. Given what analysts know about the power of transference – the power of transference to translate its objects – there could be real fears about what might be done to Freud’s texts in the apparently innocent name of new translation.

(Phillips 2007:37)

Phillips goes on to argue that an understanding of transference as a means of bringing something new into being rather than as a misreading or distortion opens up the possibility, through re-translation, of engaging anew with Freud’s texts, which may in fact be ‘of indeterminate use’ (ibid:36): as literature, as science or as both. He further argues that a new translation – viewed as an alternative to Strachey’s
Standard Edition but not as a replacement – might even allow psycho-
analysis to progress as a science (ibid:36). If one subscribes to Phillips’
view then the negative ideological effects of the Standard Edition
may be to freeze psychoanalysis in a particular moment, to hinder its
ongoing development or afterlife and to prescribe the value of Freud’s
texts for the individual reader and society at large.

**Ideology in translation: textual decision-making**

Thus far, we have considered examples of how translation can support
dominant systems of government and/or thought, and work to sup-
press emergent ideas that may have the potential to transform estab-
lished ideologies. The ideological effects of these translations are more
straightforwardly observed than the motivations behind them, which can
be nebulous and in need of distillation. But certain theorist-translators
are very explicit about their ideological approaches to translation, and
these approaches often align with a desire to challenge the (collective)
self and to encounter the ‘other’. In an essay that has become one of the
central texts of contemporary Translation Studies, ‘La traduction comme
épreuve de l’étranger’ (1985), translated into English by Lawrence Venuti
as ‘Translation and the Trials of the Foreign’, French translator and
translation theorist Antoine Berman argues that ‘the properly ethical
aim of the translating act [is] receiving the Foreign as Foreign’ (Berman
2012:241). What does Berman mean by this? Berman understands
translation as a unique opportunity to establish ‘a relationship between
the Self-Same (Propre) and the Foreign’ (ibid:240). The target reader
should experience the full strangeness of the foreign text, and the target
language should be derailed by its collision with the source language.
Translation is also an occasion for the foreign work to be tested through
its ‘uproot[ing]’ from its own language-ground', something that has the
potential to reveal its ‘most original kernel’ (ibid). Berman’s descrip-
tion of the encounter of reader and translation, of translating language
and translated language, conjures up both a mystical and an unsettling
event. The reader should feel disturbed by the translated text, the
boundaries of the translating language will be placed under strain and
the foreign text will have to prove its worth as it leaves the comfort of
its own language behind and strives for ‘success’ in another. Yet Berman’s
esoteric and violent account of the translating act also features a
detailed, twelve-point, micro-textual description of how translations
fail to achieve their properly ethical aim. For Berman, we translate in
order that readers and texts might encounter the other, and this neces-
sitates a certain method of translating which has come to be labelled
‘foreignization’, although the term is not Berman’s own and is defined
in his essay only by default, through his twelve-point ‘negative ana-
lytic’ (ibid:242), a list of domesticating and deforming tendencies that
occur in translation. Pym has criticized Berman’s ethics as stemming from an ideological viewpoint similar to Schleiermacher’s, one that has a vested interest in keeping the foreign foreign – one that ‘assumes a clear border between cultures’ (Pym 2012:10) – but I would argue that a more generous interpretation of Berman’s use of the word ‘foreign’ places his argument in a different light. The nature of the self’s encounter with the other as sketched by Berman differs from a humanist-ideological belief in the value of intercultural knowledge and exchange, in the sense that Berman’s ethics are more textual in nature. His concern is with the pursuit of literary integrity, with allowing literature to function as literature and with permitting the literary work to unfold its poetic effects. The ‘foreign’ in Berman’s essay is as much the stylistic otherness of the individual literary text as the fact of its existence in a foreign language. This would explain his interest in the trial undergone by the foreign text in translation: translation is perhaps the ultimate test of literariness. In this respect, Berman’s approach is not entirely ‘a consideration of the benefits of the Other for the Self’, as Batchelor suggests (2009:236), since the Other – the literary text – also benefits from the trial of translation (Batchelor makes the same point about Lawrence Venuti’s approach, but there the criticism may well hold true.) Nor does Berman’s approach assume an investment in cultivating distinct cultures: the hybrid language that must result from the posited collision of languages suggests that he was not particularly invested in maintaining borders.

What might Berman’s textual ethics – the ‘positive counterpart’ (Berman 2012:242) to his negative analytic – look like in practice? To arrive at some sort of model, one must work backwards from the negative analytic, which is illustrated with examples drawn from literary prose. The ‘shapelessness’ and ‘lack of control’ that is characteristic of the novel in particular means that it is a challenge for the translator to ‘avoid an arbitrary homogenization’ (ibid:243), but also that the deforming tendencies which result from the (often unconscious) drive to homogenize are less easily observed. Berman cites Dostoevsky as an example of an author whose work has been deformed in French translation. It is certainly the case that in the English-speaking world and in France there has been a movement since the 1990s to produce translations that respect Dostoevsky’s polyphonic style (France 2000:595). Although the ‘pioneering versions’ of British translator Constance Garnett ‘allowed [Dostoevsky’s] strange new voice to invade English literature’ (ibid:596), her work has also been criticized for ‘muting Dostoevsky’s jarring contrasts, sacrificing his insistent rhythms and repetitions, toning down the Russian colouring, explaining and normalizing in all kinds of ways’ (ibid:595). Other post-Garnett translators have also come in for criticism on grounds ranging from ‘lack[ing] some of the excitement of the foreign’ (ibid:596) to ‘producing texts which lack a distinctive voice’ (ibid). Russian-US translation team Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky, who are often referred to simply as P/V,
Why do we translate?

have been at the forefront of the movement to introduce Anglophone readers to a new kind of Dostoevsky. P/V have acknowledged that they were drawn to re-translate Dostoevsky’s novels because they felt that previous translations had not done justice to his polyphonic style (Pevear 1990:xii). Pevear offers the reader a sense of the translators’ ethos by stating that ‘a smooth translation of Dostoevsky would be what Paul Valéry called a “résumé that annuls resonance and form”’ (1994:xxiii).

The Garnett (1931) and P/V (1994) translations of the novel Бесы [Besy] (1872), which has been variously translated into English as The Possessed, Demons and The Devils, are contrasted in the following short extract. The scene depicted occurs early on and shows Stepan Trofimovich in conversation with the narrator. Trofimovich is in an emotional state, concerned that his forthcoming marriage to Darya Pavlovna is a cover for ‘someone else’s sins’: a sexual indiscretion that may have taken place in Switzerland.

‘But, mon cher, don’t crush me completely, don’t shout at me; as it is I’m utterly squashed like . . . a black-beetle. And, after all, I thought it was all so honourable. Suppose that something really happened . . . en Suisse . . . or was beginning. I was bound to question their hearts beforehand that I . . . enfin, that I might not constrain their hearts, and be a stumbling-block in their paths. I acted simply from honourable feeling.’

‘Oh, heavens! What a stupid thing you’ve done!’ I cried involuntarily.

‘Yes, yes,’ he assented with positive eagerness. ‘You have never said anything more just, c’était bete, mais que faire? Tout est dit.‘ I shall marry her just the same even if it be to cover ‘another’s sins’. So there was no object in writing, was there?’

(Dostoevsky, trans. Garnett 1931:110)

‘But, mon cher, don’t crush me finally, don’t yell at me; I am quite crushed as it is, like . . . a cockroach, and, finally, I think it is all so noble. Suppose there had indeed been something there . . . en Suisse . . . or there was beginning to be. Oughtn’t I to question their hearts first, so as . . . enfin, so as not to hinder their hearts or stand in their way like a post . . . solely out of nobility?’

‘Oh, God, what a stupid thing to do!’ burst from me involuntarily.

‘Stupid, stupid!’ he picked up, even greedily. ‘You’ve never said anything more intelligent, c’était bete, mais que faire, tout est dit.‘ I am getting married anyway, even if it’s to ‘someone else’s sins,’ and so what was the point of writing? Isn’t that so?’

(Dostoevsky, trans. Pevear and Volokhonsky 1994:122–3)

‡ ‘it was stupid, but what can be done, all has been said.’
Eighty years separate these two translations, which may account for some of the differences in lexical choices. Garnett is a creature of her age, hence the ennobling expression ‘heavens!’ and the dated use of ‘object’ to indicate ‘sense’ or ‘purpose’. But there is nothing particularly modern about the Pevear and Volokhonsky version either – the translators work with dictionaries to ensure that their lexical choices do not post-date the text in question (Remnick 2005). In their translation, Trofimovich’s diction is more meandering and vague on the one hand (‘Suppose there had indeed been something there […] or there was beginning to be’ contrasts sharply with Garnett’s more direct ‘Suppose that something really happened […] or was beginning’) but is blunter and funnier on the other (‘stand in their way like a post’ rather than ‘be a stumbling-block in their paths’); and whereas in Garnett’s clarifying version Trofimovich is marrying for a reason, ‘to cover another’s sins’, in the P/V version he is quite literally and more unusually marrying ‘someone else’s sins’. Even in this short excerpt, there are notable variations between the two translations in terms of their attitudes to syntax, punctuation and repetition. Garnett creates several new sentences, conforming to conventional English patterns of speech, where P/V allow Trofimovich to ramble on; Garnett opts for lexical variation (‘crush’ and ‘squashed’ to P/V’s ‘crush’ and ‘crushed’); similarly, Garnett has Trofimovich answer the narrator’s accusation of stupidity with ‘Yes, yes’; P/V have him echo the phrasing of the narrator’s accusation with ‘Stupid, stupid!’; Garnett also uses the active voice (‘I cried’) whereas P/V’s passive ‘burst from me’ is more iconic of the involuntary nature of the narrator’s statement. P/V’s decision to use the word ‘finally’ twice, where Garnett uses first ‘completely’ and then ‘after all’, makes Trofimovich’s intended meaning much more ambiguous and hints at the French adverb ‘enfin’, which Trofimovich uses elsewhere; this heightens the overall impression of French interference in his Russian. For somebody, like me, who does not read Russian, it is of course impossible to tell how each version relates to Dostoevsky’s prose without recourse to expert opinion; but even without this, it is clear that the two sets of translators give us a very different Dostoevsky, and that over the course of a lengthy novel the sum of such subtleties will become very significant indeed. This does not necessarily mean, however, that one translation is better or worse than the other, simply that the translations are creatures of different times, places and translational sensibilities, and that each pursues its own goals.

Berman may seem an unusual choice to include in a discussion of ideological motivations for translation, since his focus is textual rather than overtly political. Yet the idea of encountering the foreign in a certain manner, whether this is through confrontation – perhaps even violent confrontation – or in a more benign, assimilated form that softens ‘the assault on [the human mind] of untreated strangeness’
Why do we translate?

(Said 2003 [1978]:67) is a feature of much ideologically motivated translation. Berman reminds us that every language and culture is ethnocentrically structured, i.e. focused primarily inward, and that ethnocentric deforming forces ‘form part of the translator’s being, determining the desire to translate’ (Berman 2012:242). The inclination to transform other cultures ‘for the benefit of the receiver’ (Said 2003 [1978]:67) will always be present in the act of translation; the extent to which we resist or acquiesce depends very much upon our ideological standpoint.

US translator and theorist Lawrence Venuti has played a substantial role in shaping contemporary Translation Studies with his overt marriage of the textual and the political. His Translation Studies Reader has become the textbook of choice for many MA and PhD programmes on both sides of the Atlantic, informing the discipline’s canon, but it was his two programmatic monographs, The Translator’s Invisibility (1995) and The Scandals of Translation (1998), that added weight to its postcolonial turn in the 1990s. In The Translator’s Invisibility Venuti traces the history of translation in the English-speaking world and argues that fluency in translation has a tradition reaching back to seventeenth-century Britain. Domestication, the term Venuti uses to describe the then current dominant mode of translation, assimilates foreign literature to the literary norms of the target language, resulting in smooth, natural texts that read as though they were originally written in English. This serves to strengthen Anglo-American cultural hegemony over the rest of the world because it deprives us of an awareness of what lies beyond our borders. For Venuti, any answers to the questions of why and how we translate must take their impetus from the geo-political situation within which the translator finds him- or herself. In the second half of the twentieth century, there was a ‘trade imbalance’ (1995:17) that led to a situation of ‘unequal cultural exchanges’ (ibid:20) in which the Anglo-American market exported far more literature than it imported, thus limiting readers’ exposure to difference. Statistics reveal that this situation has not changed much in the new century: Batchelor’s analysis of the situation of the sub-Saharan Francophone African novel showed that of 1515 such novels published from the 1920s up to and including 2008, only seventy-two had been translated into English (Batchelor 2009:16). Venuti argues further that the small amount of literature that has been translated into English has tended to be subject to the extreme ‘ethnocentric violence’ (Venuti 1995:20) of a domesticating approach to translation, which neutralizes the reader’s confrontation with the foreign. Translation can thus buttress a neo-imperialist stance towards the rest of the world.

In Venuti’s view, English-language translators should work to redress this state of affairs, and he advocates several means by which this might be achieved. First, the translator can shrug off the cloak of
Why do we translate?

invisibility and adopt a foreignizing approach to the translation of literary texts. Venuti’s foreignization differs from that of Schleiermacher and Berman’s in that ‘the foreign text is privileged [. . .] only insofar as it enables a disruption of target-language cultural codes’ (Venuti 1995:42). A foreignizing approach in Venuti’s sense draws upon the resources of the target language to foreignize by analogy – he references Philip Lewis here, whose aim as a translator was to ‘recreate analogically the abuse that occurs in the original text’ (Lewis 1985:43) – rather than by literal fidelity to the source text (Venuti 1995:291). In effect, translators are to create an artificial foreignness in the target text, a foreignness that does not depend on the foreignness of the source text for inspiration. This can be achieved using the resources that English makes available, ‘introduc[ing] discursive variations, experimenting with archaism, slang, literary allusion and convention’ (ibid:310), creating a stylistic mélange. A further means of raising the profile of translation, according to Venuti, is to highlight the role of the translator using paratextual and extratextual means, cultivating a role for translators as literary experts and public intellectuals (ibid:311). Conversely, the translator can also choose to remain cloaked – adopting ‘a canonical discourse (e.g. transparency)’ (ibid:310) – in order to ‘smuggle’ a subversive text into the target culture. The choice of strategy and accompanying method ‘should be grounded on a critical assessment of the target-language culture, its hierarchies and exclusions, its relations to cultural others worldwide’ (ibid:309).

Venuti believes that contemporary Anglophone translators should translate in order to redress the balance of political and cultural power – to confront English-language readers with difference so that they come to think of themselves as only one culture among many, rather than as an imperial centre. Pym is dismissive of the ideology that informs this view: ‘[it is] as if, in the pipedreams of New York intellectuals, a change in literary translating would somehow make a whole society aware of what it is doing in the world’ (Pym 2012:17). He finds fault with Venuti and, by extension, with Berman, for their investment in translations that are difficult to read since these are, he argues, elitist and hence unlikely to have a wider impact (ibid:35). US scholar Douglas Robinson agrees that Venuti’s work displays ‘uncomfortable rapprochements with elitism’ (1997:99), but he also argues elsewhere, in a critique of Berman’s approach and ‘timid foreignism’ in general (ibid:95), that ‘radical and aggressive domestication’ (ibid) – Venuti’s foreignization under a different name – is ‘the most effective way to unsettle the complacent reader’ (ibid:96). Venuti himself warns that foreignizing translation should ‘stop short of the parodic or the incomprehensible’ (1995:311), also arguing that the significance of a particular text may warrant a domesticating approach to its translation. While one is sympathetic to Pym’s insistence that the translator cannot operate outside the commercial realm, which is what the translator risks when ‘playing with language alone’ (Pym 2012:35), the situation of translation in the
late capitalist marketplace is shockingly asymmetrical: there are a handful of dominant export literatures rather than an equitable exchange of literatures across linguistic boundaries. Resistance may have to be afforded wherever windows of opportunities exist, however small or elitist. A more fruitful critique of Venuti’s position is made by Batchelor, who argues that in Venuti’s drive to overcome ethnocentrism, he is ethnocentrically concerned only with ‘the benefits of the Other for the Self’ (Batchelor 2009:236). His foreignization is not motivated by a textual ethics of respect for literary integrity, and it may even falsely represent the Other in its attempts to disrupt dominant target-language values. Venuti’s ethnocentrism may also extend to the erroneous assumption that there is such a thing as a transnational Anglo-American literary culture. To fully appreciate Venuti’s position, as well as that of his critics, it is worth considering what a domesticating translation might look like and the relationship between this approach to translation and the literary marketplace.

Defining domestication

There are a variety of levels on which a text might – theoretically speaking – be domesticated: references to culturally specific elements such as social practices or food items could be removed or replaced; even more radically, a text could be relocated to a domestic setting. ‘Difficult’ texts might be made more readable by eradicating foregrounded stylistic features, replacing unusual lexical items and turns of phrase with more everyday language and normalizing syntax. Genre fiction could come to resemble its domestic equivalent, even where two national versions do not straightforwardly align. Domestication could also manifest itself as censorship, with elements considered offensive or inappropriate in the receiving culture being removed or rewritten, perhaps leading to substantial abridgement. If one shares Venuti’s point of view, a domesticating approach reflects a need or a desire to deny difference, assimilate the other, strengthen one’s own hegemonic position and create a false sense of the universality of a particular national position. But translators and publishers who openly aim for domestication would not explain their motivations in these terms. Translations are commodities that can make money: domestication is seen as the prerequisite for readability and hence the route to commercial success. Barry Cunningham, founder and Managing Director of children’s publishing house Chicken House, and the editor who pulled J.K. Rowling’s Harry Potter from the slush pile, implicitly defines domestication as a form of localization or rebranding:

Once we’ve got the translation, we treat it almost like it’s an entirely new book. This is an opportunity to make the book work in another language, and so we might go back to the author and look again at