In this chapter, I consider how the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein can be of use to the translator who is reading the source text for translation. I examine: Wittgenstein’s stress on looking at phenomena; his notion of language-games; his notion of forms of life; how his work supports a descriptive approach to the source text. I then apply insights from Wittgenstein to examples taken from poetry, theology and from non-literary texts. Finally, I draw conclusions.

On not thinking but looking

Gary Hagberg refers to ‘the post-Wittgensteinian climate’ in the humanities in general (1995:1). Translation can now be described analogously as ‘translation after Wittgenstein’: trivially, in that it comes after his death in 1951; actually, in that Wittgenstein has changed the intellectual landscape; potentially, in that translators and translation theorists may choose to learn from his methods and to apply them.

The sociologist Pierre Bourdieu was once asked why he often quoted Wittgenstein in his work, and replied: ‘Wittgenstein is probably the philosopher who has helped me most at moments of difficulty. He’s a kind of saviour for times of great intellectual distress’ (1990:9). How is the later Wittgenstein able to achieve this effect, and how can Wittgenstein help the translator as well as the sociologist?

The *Investigations* is a work that makes its readers see things differently. Wittgenstein considered using a line from Shakespeare’s *King Lear* as its motto: ‘I’ll teach you differences’. Translation of all types involves looking at the features of the source text in order to represent those features in another language, and Wittgenstein can help the translator in this task because he can teach us about differences, giving this instruction to the reader in *Investigations* 66: ‘don’t think, but look!’.

I now give Wittgenstein’s story of the wood sellers as an example of his methods (*RFM* I-143 ff.). This story has been linked to translation by Martin Kusch (2012).
(12) People pile up logs and sell them, the piles are measured with a ruler, the measurements of length, breadth, and height multiplied together, and what comes out is the number of pence which have to be asked and given. They do not know ‘why’ it happens like this; they simply do it like this: that is how it is done. … Very well; but what if they piled the timber in heaps of arbitrary, varying height and then sold it at a price proportionate to the area covered by the piles? And what if they even justified this with the words: ‘Of course, if you buy more timber you must pay more’? … How could I show them that – as I should say – you don’t really buy more wood if you buy a pile covering a bigger area? – I should, for instance, take a pile which was small by their ideas and, by laying the logs around, change it into a ‘big’ one. This might convince them – but perhaps they would say: ‘Yes, now it’s a lot of wood and costs more’ – and that would be the end of the matter. – We should presumably say in this case: they simply do not mean the same by ‘a lot of wood’ and ‘a little wood’ as we do; and they have a different system of payment from us.

It might seem that communication with the wood sellers has broken down (Cerbone 2000:300), but there is nothing more unfathomable about their practice than about the medieval custom of selling wood by the ell (Glock 2008:38). As David Cerbone notes: ‘The problem we confront in thinking about this community is not a problem in their practices, but rather a problem for us in interpreting just what it is that they are doing’ (2000:301). Could we translate what the wood sellers have to say, assuming their language were not ours? Kusch imagines them using the word myynti [Finnish: sale], and argues that translation would be possible: ‘What justifies translating “myynti” as “measuring and selling wood” is nothing to do with charity and rationality; it is simply the similarity between the tribe’s behaviour and our behaviour when we measure and sell wood’ (2012:64). Wittgenstein’s stress on practice enables the translator to see how translation can proceed. The context has to be taken into account and the imagination used, in accordance with what Wittgenstein has to say about significance: ‘What is happening now has significance – in these surroundings. The surroundings “give it its importance”’ (PI 583). And were the wood sellers to write poems, or scriptures or advertisements for wood, or legal documents about the selling of wood, then we could translate those, too. How well we would translate is, of course, another question.

Wittgenstein describes philosophy as a battle against ‘the bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language’ (PI 109). His contention can be supported by recent work by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson on cognitive metaphor. They show how certain cognitive metaphors can mislead us into thinking that meaning has an existence independent of words, as in the ‘container metaphor’: when somebody says, for example, that it is difficult to put his or her thoughts into words (Lakoff and Johnson 2003:11). To view things as they are may be more difficult than may be at first thought because of the way that language operates. As Marjorie Perloff explains, Wittgenstein allows us to see how everything
happens exactly as it does while realising that, at any given moment, we also conjecture that everything might have happened otherwise (1996:19).

That it is possible to link Wittgenstein to theorists such as Lakoff and Johnson strengthens the case for looking at his work in translation. Similarly, Wittgenstein supports and is supported by Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995), where the stress on engaging with the words of the speaker parallels Wittgenstein's notion of the form of life, and where Relevance Theory's rejection of a code model of meaning in favour of an inferential model parallels Wittgenstein's insistence on looking at how words are used. Again, Michael Burke, writing in cognitive poetics, uses the concept of the cognitive scenario as a tool to facilitate the understanding of poetry, giving the example of the pub (2003:68). Most people know the sort of things to expect when they enter a pub: drink and food for sale, quiz machines, tables at which to sit, a bar, etc. The translator must become acquainted with the cognitive scenario of the text that he or she is to translate: love poem, song, legal document, scientific report, etc. Wittgenstein's methods offer a way to construct the cognitive scenario. The attentive reader of the *Investigations* is offered tools to allow him or her to become adept at seeing what is at stake in a text, at becoming at home there. For the translator, this involves moving to a better position to translate, by seeing aspects of the source text and responding to them, just as one might note differences between a German pub and an English pub, but come to feel at home in both.

It is trivially true that nobody can translate a text that he or she has not read. Clive Scott sees a translator as 'someone who reads in order to write' (2008:17). Parallel to physical necessity is aesthetic necessity, however, because the translator must make decisions during the process of reading about how he or she will write the target text. In *Investigations* 164, Wittgenstein shows how the term 'reading' is used for 'a family of cases', so that we are misled by the use of the same word 'reading' into thinking that, for example, reading silently and reading aloud are the same thing, whereas very different criteria apply. As Jean Boase-Beier points out, 'reading for translation' differs from other types of reading, such as reading for pleasure or reading for information (2006:24). To sit down and read, say, an article on the Cold War with a view to translating it may lead to the translator noting how certain aspects of the source text might be maintained in his or her translation. The tentative formulation of a rendering becomes part of the reading process.

The *Investigations* offers a series of exercises that can be used by the translator to this end. In *Investigations* 336, for example, Wittgenstein tells the story of a French politician who failed to look outside the constraints of his own language:

(13) [The case when] someone imagines that one could not think a sentence with the curious word order of German or Latin just as it stands. One first has to think it, and then one arranges the words in that strange order. (A French politician once wrote that it was a peculiarity of the French language that in it words occur in the order in which one thinks them.)
A speaker of French may find it ‘curious’ that in German the main verb is in terminal position in subordinate clauses, as in example (14):

(14) Weil die See blau ist.

because the sea blue is

The error is to fail to realise that what we have is a different way of using language, not a faulty encryption of a French pattern, where the verb would follow the subject, as in example (15):

(15) Parce que la mer est bleue.

because the sea is blue

Germans, similarly, are surprised that in French the predicative adjective agrees with the substantive in gender, which it does not in German (PI 538). In example (15), the adjective bleu has become bleue because it must agree with the feminine noun la mer. No such change was necessary to the German adjective blau in example (14).

Wittgenstein’s French politician has made the error of seeing French as a language that corresponds to the language of thought, an essentialist view that fails to note how language is a dynamic system that can be used in different ways. Essentialism is one of Wittgenstein’s major targets. Rather than one essence, phenomena exhibit many differences. To give two examples: contemporary French is very different from the French of the Middle Ages; there are many varieties of French at any one time. Wittgenstein satirises the politician’s view that French is the norm, i.e. the one and only language in which it is not necessary first to think the words and then to arrange them into the curious word order of the other language in question. By the use of a particular example, he questions the whole tendency to form ideologies of language. Anthony Lodge, for example, argues that French, like any other language, may exhibit clarity and logic not in itself but in the way that it is used by effective speakers (1998:29). It is necessary to look at how speakers and writers choose to speak or to write, i.e. how they use the language, rather than to begin with a theory of how language directs its speakers.

We have a tendency to divide texts arbitrarily into content and form, rather than looking at the texts themselves. Matt Madden, discussing his presentation of the same domestic story in ninety-nine different drawings, concludes that the debate needs to be moved away from the eternal battle between form and content or style and substance to a new model: ‘form as content, and substance inseparable from style’ (2006:1). Wittgenstein can help the reader to do this by his assertion that meaning is ‘a physiognomy’ (PI 568). If I want to know what somebody is feeling, then it is a good idea to look at his or her face. David Cockburn notes how much ‘of what we learn about others we learn through their emotional expression’ (2009:128). If I want to know what a Shakespeare sonnet or an advertisement or a joke means, then I similarly need to look at the physiognomy.
We can understand physiognomy in terms of choice of words, following Wittgenstein (‘Philosophy’ p. 165):

(16) The choice of our words is so important, because the point is to hit upon the physiognomy of the thing exactly, because only the exactly aimed thought can lead to the correct track. The car must be placed on the tracks precisely so, so that it can keep rolling correctly.

Thus the sentences in examples (17) and (18) may be thought to have the same meaning because they can be used in the same way, i.e. they both describe the same event:

(17) Brutus killed Caesar.

(18) Caesar was killed by Brutus.

However, the physiognomies differ: (17) is in the active voice and (18) is in the passive voice. As Steven Pinker notes, many stylists have advocated avoiding the passive, but recent linguistic research has shown that this voice ‘has a number of indispensable functions because of the way it engages a reader’s attention and memory’ (2014:3). Example (18) foregrounds the figure of Caesar and therefore his betrayal at the hands of his friend Brutus (if we assume that the reference is to the events in Rome in 44 BCE). How something is said is as important as what is said. Elements such as repetition, iconicity, emphasis, etc. can all change the meaning of an expression. They are not ornamental, as can be seen by comparing the sentences in examples (19) and (20):

(19) I ought to buy a present for my friend.

(20) I *ought* to buy a present for my friend.

The use of italics in (20) can be read as implying that I am not going to buy my friend a present, even though I feel that I should. In a law report, the choice of one word over another can give rise to a vast amount of exegesis. Enrique Alcaraz and Brian Hughes note how judges are often forced to become ‘linguists and philologists’ (2001:26), and they offer a detailed description of the characteristics of legal English in their book on legal translation (2006:4–14). They are describing the physiognomy of legal English. Similarly, Madame Bovary by Gustave Flaubert, Effi Briest by Theodor Fontane and Anna Karenina by Leo Tolstoy are all nineteenth-century novels (in French, German and Russian respectively) with eponymous female protagonists who engage in affairs. The writers, however, choose to tell their stories very differently.

Wittgenstein sees reading as a set of practices that can be taught, in accordance with the general contention of the *Investigations* that the mastery of a language is the mastery of a technique (PI 199). Wittgenstein can therefore be used in the
training of translators, whether at the beginning of their careers or in terms of ongoing development. Jean Boase-Beier, addressing how literary translators can be trained, stipulates that attention must be given to the way in which they read the source text and not on the way in which they translate. She concludes: ‘What training of translators involves is showing them how language works, above all how literary language works, so that in any individual case they will have at their disposal the means for understanding how the particular text works’ (1998:41). Her point would apply to any text being translated, not just literary texts. In order to translate a text, the translator needs to have investigated its physiognomy. In Culture and Value p. 80, Wittgenstein analogously stresses that to learn how to appreciate music begins with learning how music works, and the Investigations forms a set of exercises that students could undertake in order better to understand how language works. To read one of the book’s stories, such as the builders who communicate using only the four words ‘block’, ‘pillar’, ‘slab’ and ‘beam’ (PI 2 ff.), is to be invited to see language in a different way and to deepen our understanding of it, hence illuminating the reading for translation of any source text. (This story is discussed in the next section.)

Human beings bring many preconceptions to the understanding of what goes on in reading. If I pick up a piece of paper covered in symbols and am able to read an account written by somebody whom I have never met, detailing events of which I could have had no prior knowledge, then this appears to be very like breaking a code, and the code model of communication, defined by Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson as the belief that ‘communication is achieved by encoding and decoding messages’ (1995:2), has been very influential in views on reading. The young Jude, in Thomas Hardy’s 1895 novel Jude the Obscure, has such a code model in his head when he forms the desire to learn Latin and Greek, a task that seems to him to be straightforward:

(21) He concluded that a grammar of the required tongue would contain, primarily, a rule, a prescription, or clue of the nature of a secret cipher, which, once known, would enable him, by merely applying it, to change at will all words of his own speech into those of the foreign one.

(2007:28)

Jude’s ‘childish idea’ is to assume that there is a ‘law of transmutation’ (2007:29), and he is devastated to learn that this is not so and that he will have to learn the necessary vocabulary and grammar.

Jude has a false picture of language. He is freed from it by his study of the classics, but his idea remains emblematic of the human tendency to see meaning and hence translation in terms of cryptography, by which the reader with a key can crack the code and find the solution to what was formerly unintelligible (Piper and Murphy 2002:2). Language does have a code aspect: to teach somebody to read English it is necessary to show how certain letters relate to certain sounds. But this is not the whole picture and Wittgenstein makes clear that language is much more than a calculus; it is a human practice, as discussed in Investigations 81:
Reading the source text for translation

(22) All this, however, can appear in the right light only when one has attained greater clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning something and thinking. For it will then also become clear what may mislead us (and did mislead me) into thinking that if anyone utters a sentence and means or understands it, he is thereby operating a calculus according to definite rules.

The code model is not used by contemporary linguists, though some scholars who did use it, such as Roman Jakobson, still have an influence on contemporary work in translation studies (cf. Jakobson 2012). It might therefore seem that to turn to Wittgenstein as a way of freeing oneself from the code model is to use the philosopher to fight against a straw man. This is not the case, however, because to see language as a calculus is a psychological rather than a logical compulsion (Bellos 2011:258), a point made by Wittgenstein in *Investigations* 140; and the compulsion has not gone away because of developments in linguistics. Maria Tymoczko calls decoding/encoding the ‘black box model’ of translation, remarking that outside scholarly debate ‘the overall picture of a single translator engaged in a mysterious inner process (conditioned, of course, by social context) continues to hold sway’ (2006:18). Wittgenstein’s own journey in text (22) mirrors the journey that translators may have to make, from seeing language as a calculus to realising that the situation is much more complicated.

Modern manuals on translation therefore still find it necessary to point out to their readers that translation is not about decoding. Douglas Robinson, for example, states:

(23) What we do *not* do is sit down with a comprehensive set of rules for linguistic equivalence and create a text that conforms to them. That is the image projected by traditional linguists when they have studied translation; the image does not correspond to reality.

(2003:148)

The code model lives on as a cognitive tendency that must be resisted.

From a Wittgensteinian point of view, the model of reading as decoding represents a failure in how a text is to be read. It is not that the decoding model is a possibility that can be rejected as part of a strategy, but that the decoding model is wrong *per se*, by being too narrow and by failing to do justice to what people can do with language. Robinson, following Wittgenstein, stresses that translators ‘don’t translate words; they translate what people do with words’ (2003:142). The *Investigations* is a set of exercises that can lead a translator to this conclusion. Again and again Wittgenstein shows our tendency to see language as a calculus. Again and again he seeks to undermine this tendency, through sustained use of parables, stories, dialogues, analogies, etc. in order to change his reader’s way of thinking, by encouraging his reader to look.

Why should we bother with Wittgenstein if other authorities are available? There are certainly important similarities between Wittgenstein and, say, the
Russian Formalists, such as the stress on what Wittgenstein would call a physiognomy and the Formalists would call style; but Jon Cook and Rupert Read ask whether there are any differences that make using the Wittgensteinian philosophical investigation worthwhile and conclude that Wittgenstein’s work can offer ‘a phenomenology of the experience of reading literature’ (2010:473). Such a phenomenology, which I think holds for the reading of all texts, would run parallel to other approaches to reading, such as linguistic or literary approaches, rather than replacing them, because it is a philosophical inquiry. It forces us to see the bewitching effects of language.

In terms of accounting for phenomena, Wittgenstein introduces the term ‘surveyable representation’ (PI 122). (Wittgenstein’s German expression übersichtliche Darstellung [overviewing representation] is often given in English as ‘perspicuous representation’, based on the translation by Elizabeth Anscombe (2001). The 2009 revision of the Investigations by Peter Hacker and Joachim Schulte uses ‘surveyable representation’ on the grounds that it preserves the references to ‘view’ and ‘survey’ in the German (PI p. 252)). Wittgenstein defines the surveyable representation as the attempt to form an overview in which one is enabled to see connections. It is important for the translator as reader to form a surveyable representation of the source text, which begins by not seeing it as something to be decoded, and proceeds to look at the physiognomies that are to be found there.

Wittgenstein speaks of ‘the dawning of an aspect’, i.e. when we see phenomena in new ways, something that is important in translation. As Clive Scott notes, to translate is ‘both to capture one’s perception of the text and to develop new modes of seeing it’ (2014:ix). Wittgenstein compares the dawning of an aspect and the ‘continuous seeing of an aspect’, using Joseph Jastrow’s ‘duck–rabbit’ as an illustration (PPF 118). The duck–rabbit was designed by Jastrow to show how seeing something is more complicated than often thought. The drawing can be correctly described as that of a duck or of a rabbit. It is reproduced as Figure 2.1.

For Wittgenstein, the duck–rabbit shows the difference between ‘seeing’ and ‘seeing as’. Two people may both see the figure, and one may see it as a duck, the other as a rabbit. The second viewer may suddenly see a different aspect, so that the image can now be described as a duck. Neither view of the duck–rabbit is exclusively correct, hence its blended name. Wittgenstein stresses that if I say that I see it as a picture of a rabbit, then ‘I would simply have described my perception’ (PPF 122). Somebody might look at the picture and only ever see a rabbit. When the new aspect dawns, it is both an expression of a ‘new perception and, at the same time, an expression of an unchanged perception’ (PPF 130), assuming that we do not conclude that the original perception was wrong. Wittgenstein’s use of the duck–rabbit illustrates his own method of trying to change the way that people look, especially at language (PI 144). Nothing in the phenomenon changes; what changes is how we see it. With respect to reading for translation, the duck–rabbit can be viewed in two ways. First, it shows how the translator may decide to maintain in translation aspects that he or she has noted in the source text (Oliveira 2012). Second, the translator may, through attention, come to see aspects other than those that were initially apparent.
The traditional French saying given as example (24) puns on the fact that *je suis* can mean both ‘I am’ and ‘I follow’, though the equivocation is not initially apparent:

\[
\begin{align*}
(24) & \\
\text{Je suis ce que je suis;} & \text{} \\
I & \text{ am that } I \text{ am} \\
\text{je ne suis pas ce que je suis;} & \text{} \\
I & \text{ (not) am not that } I \text{ follow} \\
\text{si j’étais ce que je suis,} & \text{} \\
\text{if } I & \text{ were that } I \text{ follow} \\
\text{je ne serais pas ce que je suis.} & \text{} \\
I & \text{ (not) would-be not that } I \text{ am}
\end{align*}
\]

Initially, the saying comes over as a puzzle, because the speaker seems to be saying that he or she both is and is not what he or she is. When it is guessed or revealed that the words are spoken by a farmer driving a donkey to market, other aspects dawn and the relevant meanings of *je suis* can be inferred (as in my gloss of (24)). The speaker now is a philosopher, musing on human nature.

Failure to see aspects is referred to by Wittgenstein as ‘aspect-blindness’, akin to the lack of a musical ear (*PPF* 260), and the *Investigations* can be described as an attempt to overcome aspect-blindness. As Hans-Joachim Glock comments, the aspect-blind person can use words correctly, but ‘has no “feel” for their physiognomy’ (1996:40). Successful translation depends upon such a feel for physiognomy. The best-selling Swedish novel *Män som hatar kvinnor* [*Men who hate women*], by Stieg Larsson, has been translated into English by Reg Keeland as *The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo* on the basis that overt gender politics would not go down well in an English title (*Humphrey et al.* 2011:np). Overcoming aspect-blindness is a matter of training. Wittgenstein notes how it is possible to be trained to read a poem with feeling, by paying particular attention to the intonation, so that the poem is read in a different way from how it would be read if scanned for information (*PPF* 264). Reading a poem with feeling is a practice: ‘I can also give a word an intonation
which makes its meaning stand out from the rest, almost as if the word were a portrait of the whole thing' (PPF 264).

Meaning, then, is a matter of coherence, of things making grammatical sense in context. John Gibson (2004:117) calls such coherence ‘the wonder of agreement’, citing Wittgenstein’s example in Investigations 50 of the standard metre in a Paris archive, held to be the measure for making rulers, etc. There is nothing arcane about this metre-rule, which has ‘no extraordinary properties’. It was simply used by those who needed it, on the proviso that, wherever the metrical system was established, it should be taken as standard. Similarly, custom decrees that the word ‘dog’ in English means what it does in the contexts where it is used. A word has an agreed application within a context. Words can therefore change or expand their meaning – for example, the noun ‘mouse’ has taken on a new meaning as a piece of computer hardware. The Paris metre remained in Wittgenstein’s day a standard by which things could be measured, just as a dictionary may be used when finding out the meaning of words. Dictionaries, standard measures and words all have different uses in our lives, but their meaning is to be sought in the way that they are employed.

Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy ‘is radically at odds with a traditional conception of philosophy as a form of positive theoretical inquiry into the nature of world, mind and language’ (Kahane et al. 2007:11), as can be seen in Wittgenstein’s definition of his discipline in Investigations 126:

(25) Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. – Since everything lies open to view, there is nothing to explain. For whatever may be hidden is of no interest to us.

Philosophy is a matter of description rather than of discovery. Reading for translation therefore involves the formation of the surveyable representation by looking rather than thinking, and by realising that nothing is hidden.

**Language-games**

Wittgenstein opens the Investigations with a passage from Augustine’s Confessions (PI 1):

(26) When grown-ups named some object and at the same time turned towards it, I perceived this, and I grasped that the thing was signified by the sound that they uttered, since they meant to point *it* out. This, however, I gathered from their gestures, the natural language of all peoples, the language that by means of facial expression and the play of eyes, of the movements of the limbs and the tone of voice, indicates the affections of the soul when it desires, or clings to, or rejects, or recoils from, something. In this way, little by little, I learnt to understand what things the words, which I heard uttered in their respective places in various sentences, signified. And once I got my tongue round these signs, I used them to express my wishes.
Here is a story of how language is learned. I shall refer to it as ‘the Augustinian paradigm’ to distinguish it from Augustine’s theory of language (Kerr 1988:56), which lies outside the scope of this book and to which Wittgenstein does not refer. The Augustinian paradigm describes learning language as a process of denotation, of ostensive definition. If I want to show a child what a dog is, I point at the dog; the word ‘dog’ denotes the furry animal in the corner of the room and the child learns how to recognise and then apply the term. The theme of the *Investigations* has been introduced, i.e. the investigation of the human person as linguistic. As Peter Hacker comments, human linguistic behaviour has to be ‘understood and interpreted in the sense in which the behaviour of inanimate nature and much of animal behaviour do not’ (2001:68).

Wittgenstein, in the opening sections of the *Investigations*, takes his reader through a series of scenarios designed to show that the Augustinian paradigm is too narrow. It offers a code model of language, a picture theory like that of Wittgenstein’s early work, in which terms are held to stand for things in the world (TL-P 2.161). Wittgenstein shows the limitations of this view. For example, in *Investigations* 2 he tells the story of the two builders, A and B, as an instance of where ‘the description given by Augustine is right’:

(27) A is building with building stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass him the stones and to do so in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they make use of a language consisting of the words ‘block’, ‘pillar’, ‘slab’, ‘beam’. A calls them out; B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call. – Conceive of this as a complete primitive language.

At this very basic level, A and B function as builders who successfully communicate, in the sense that things get built, so that Augustine ‘does describe a system of communication’ (*PI* 3). It is too limited, however, to fit the way that people live outside the story. The Augustinian paradigm shows how nouns might be learned, as Wittgenstein remarks:

(28) Someone who describes the learning of language like this is, I believe, thinking primarily of nouns like ‘table’, ‘chair’, ‘bread’, and of people’s names, and only secondarily of the names of certain actions and properties; and of the remaining kinds of word as something that will take care of itself.

The builders function according to the Augustinian paradigm as they only need to use the four nouns for different types of building material; but once other elements are introduced, such as numbers or demonstratives, then the paradigm collapses (*PI* 8 ff.). The significance of the paradigm lies in how it exemplifies a common and natural way of looking at language (Bellos 2011:83), but which is more like an account of how people learn a second foreign language than a first language, as Wittgenstein points out in *Investigations* 32. It is as if the child
Augustine had gone abroad, already able to think and already having a language, but not the language of the new country. Things in the world as we find it are more complicated. For a start, there are many different types of utterance. In *Investigations* 23, Wittgenstein attacks the traditional view in logic (fundamental to the *Tractatus*) that there are three types of proposition: the statement, the question and the command. Against his earlier picture theory of language, Wittgenstein investigates the way that people use words in the language as a whole and in immediate context. He introduces the concept of the ‘language-game’ to explain this (*PI* 23):

> (29) We can think of the whole process of using words … as one of those games by means of which children learn their native language. I will call these games ‘language-games’ and will sometimes speak of a primitive language as a language-game. … I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, a ‘language-game’.

He indicates a multiplicity of linguistic activities that can be categorised as language-games (*PI* 23):

> (30) Giving orders, and acting on them –
> Describing an object by its appearance, or by its measurements –
> Constructing an object from a description (a drawing) –
> Reporting an event –
> Speculating about the event –
> Forming and testing a hypothesis –
> Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams –
> Making up a story; and reading one –
> Acting in a play –
> Singing rounds –
> Guessing riddles –
> Cracking a joke; telling one –
> Solving a problem in applied arithmetic –
> Translating from one language into another –
> Requesting, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.

Instead of three types of linguistic activity, there are many: the list could be extended indefinitely. It is interesting that translation is described as a language-game. The sorts of activity that Wittgenstein describes are also those typically encountered by translators, who translate orders, descriptions, hypotheses, jokes, curses, prayers, etc., rather than one form of source text.

As Wittgenstein notes, to ask ‘What is a word really?’ is like asking what a piece in chess is (*PI* 108). A piece in chess has a set move that it can make according to agreed rules, but there are many positions in which it might end up and many ways
in which it can be used, especially when it is recalled that no chess piece operates in isolation. The mistake would be to describe its physical appearance and to think that there was an end of it. Something similar is true of words. To say that ‘dog’ is a noun of three letters may be an important observation, but there is a lot more that can be said about how the word can be used.

Such an approach is of use to the translator, who can be brought to see that reading is not an invariant procedure but a practice carried out by people in many different ways as they engage with the various language-games played in a text, rather than dealing with denotations. Wittgenstein describes how a sentence from a story may make complete sense in isolation, so that a context may be invented, but that ‘I do not understand it in the sense in which I should understand it if I had read the story’ (Philosophical Grammar I 5).

As Peter Hacker comments, meaning is not a matter of scientific discovery (2007b:46). It is much more than denotation, than the Augustinian paradigm of the child pointing at the furry animal in the corner and working out that it is the dog. In Investigations 43, Wittgenstein advances a different way of looking at meaning:

\[(31)\] For a large class of cases of the employment of the word ‘meaning’ – though not for all – this word can be explained in this way: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.

This remark is probably the most celebrated in the Investigations (Hacker 2010). Wittgenstein is careful to stress that exceptions do arise, because there are cases when the Augustinian paradigm is correct, i.e. when the meaning can be explained by ‘pointing to its bearer’ (PI 43), as in the case of the primitive language employed by the builders in Investigations 2. In most cases, however, meaning is best grasped by looking at use.

An example of how this epistemological instruction \(1\) can be applied to everyday language is given by Duncan Richter, who examines the concept of happiness, showing that it is a ‘blurry and elusive’ concept (2009:198). When a City banker and a Buddhist say they are happy, they may be playing different language-games, confusing psychologists by their employment of the same adjective, so that is the psychologists wrongly assume that they are referring to the same phenomenon. To understand the difference between the two individuals would involve looking at a wide range of examples from their respective lives, which may, for example, lead to a conclusion that the happy banker is talking about hedonism and the happy Buddhist is talking about spirituality. What matters is what they are doing with the word ‘happy’. There is one word but two uses. It is not as if there were some mystical meaning attached to ‘happy’ so that word and meaning are separate entities. Wittgenstein gives this parable to illustrate the point: we do not have both the money and the cow that we can buy with it; we have only the money, which means that we can do certain things, such as buy a cow (PI 120). It is therefore important, as Hacker asserts, to distinguish between a meaningful sentence and the meaningful use of a sentence (2010:32–3). The sentence in the following example
is meaningful: it is well formed according to rules given by English grammars and would be readily understood by a competent speaker of English:

(32) I am happy.

To establish its meaningful use, however, a number of other criteria are relevant, such as: who says it; when it was said; in what circumstances it was said; how it contributes to a move in a language-game, etc. If I am told that it was said by a banker to her boss after receiving her bonus, then I have a meaningful use of (32). I can see how a language-game is being played and this may help me to read it for translation.

Any source text can be read in terms of the language-games played. James Joyce’s 1922 novel Ulysses, which tells of one day in Dublin, uses a variety of narrative approaches that can be seen as language-games: drama (1992:561–703); catechism (1992:776–871); interior monologue (1992:871–933), etc. Similarly, the legal translator dealing with a text concerned with court proceedings will find different language-games being played: the le-galese of lawyers; the everyday language of lay witnesses and litigants; the slang of the police and the criminal underworld; the technical jargon of expert witnesses (Alcaraz and Hughes 2001:14).

Looking at language-games enables the translator to be aware that a great number of things may go on in the text. It enables him or her to be aware that language is a ‘spatial and temporal phenomenon’ rather than ‘some non-spatial, atemporal non-entity’ (PI 108). The Augustinian paradigm of language as labeling is too limited but is a common one. As Marie McGinn notes, in the Augustinian paradigm

(33) we are focusing on one central case – the case of naming people or things – and overlooking the complexity that is inherent in our language-games; it is only when we turn our attention to language in use that we begin to see our original picture as a misleading over-simplification.

(2008:62)

By turning our attention away from the denotative, we realise how much more complicated matters are, for even the simplest form of language-game admits of variation (PI 6).

Wittgenstein shows how problematic the notion of ostensive definition is by the example of trying to define the notion of ‘two’ by showing somebody two nuts (PI 28). There is a danger that the student may think that he or she is learning the word for a particular group of nuts. The contrary can also happen, when the student mistakes the name of a particular group of nuts for the number ‘two’. Wittgenstein concludes: ‘an ostensive definition can be variously interpreted in any case’. This notion is taken further in philosophy by Willard Van Orman Quine, who addresses the ‘indeterminacy of translation’ through the story of the field linguist who finds it impossible to pin down the meaning of the word Gavagai, which
is uttered by locals whenever a rabbit appears: it could mean ‘rabbit’, or ‘food’ or ‘let’s go hunting’, etc. (2013:23ff.). As Wittgenstein notes, there comes a point when even pointing at places and things will only work when the pointing ‘occurs in the use of the words too and not merely in learning the use’ (PI 9).

Wittgenstein’s distinction between surface grammar and depth grammar is useful here (PI 664):

(34) In the use of words, one might distinguish ‘surface grammar’ from ‘depth grammar’. What immediately impresses itself upon us about the use of a word is the way that it is used in the sentence structure, the part of its use – one might say – that can be taken in by the ear. – And now compare the depth grammar, say of the verb ‘to mean’, with what its surface grammar would lead us to presume. No wonder one finds it difficult to know one’s way about.

The distinction between surface grammar and depth grammar does not contradict Wittgenstein’s stress in Investigations: 126 that everything of interest is on the surface and that nothing of interest is hidden, because we can only understand depth grammar by a careful reading of surface grammar. Surface grammar is what the grammatical form of a statement seems to offer; depth grammar is how the statement is used, something indicated by the context. Jean Boase-Beier, for example, notes that translation is not only about transferring the surface features of the source text onto the target text (2011:17). (It is interesting to note that Noam Chomsky uses the terms ‘surface structure’ and ‘deep structure’. However, although Chomsky’s surface structure is similar to Wittgenstein’s surface grammar, his deep structure is used in a different way from Wittgenstein’s depth grammar: it ‘determines properties of semantic significance’ (Collins 2008:160)).

Peter Hacker compares two utterances:

(35) I don’t know what he means.

(36) I don’t know what I want.

(2010:31)

The two sentences are similar in terms of surface grammar. They both begin with ‘I don’t know what’, followed by subject and main verb in the simple present indicative active. In terms of depth grammar, they are different, however, because the respective use is different: (35) is a confession of ignorance, while (36) is a confession of indecision (and the situation may become more complicated if the context is stipulated). As Hacker comments, in craving uniformity we overlook the ‘fluidity, flexibility, forms of context-variability and distinctive uses of our language and its instruments’ (2010:31). It is a critical lesson for a translator to learn: how to see differences.

When reading well formed sentences for translation, the surface grammar is usually clear enough, but the depth grammar can be more problematic. Louis Sass notes, for example, how Daniel Paul Schreber’s memoirs of his mental illness have
a ‘tentative, non-literal quality’ more apparent in the German source text (Schreber 2003) than in the English target text (MacAlpine and Hunter 2000), where the translators omit ‘many frequently used phrases and particles that would have been translated in English as ‘in part’, ‘on the other hand’, ‘so to speak’, ‘up to a point’ and ‘in a way’’ (Sass 1994:28). The translators’ strategy has the effect of making Schreber seem less aware that he is mentally ill in the target text than in the source text, so that source and target texts can be said to have different depth grammars. A reading of Wittgenstein suggests that the translator ought to preserve depth grammar. In the case of Schreber’s account, a significant feature of his illness will not be available to English readers and so it will fail as a surveyable representation.

Wittgenstein’s presentation of the Augustinian paradigm is not meant to dismiss as stupid the way that we instinctively operate: ‘the difficulty is to remove the prejudice which stands in the way … It is not a stupid prejudice’ (PI 340). Norman Malcolm records that Wittgenstein’s decision to use Augustine came about ‘not because he could not find the conception expressed in that quotation stated as well by other philosophers, but because the conception must be important if so great a mind held it’ (1984:59). The Augustinian paradigm shows the way that we naturally tend to think about language, although Augustine himself never claims that his account of how he acquired language should be seen as an account of the whole language. The paradigm is not easy to shift, hence the lengthy treatment of Augustine’s story in Investigations 1. Wittgenstein’s aim is to bring about clarity in the reader, as he points out in Investigations 133:

(37) For the clarity we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity.

In this remark, Wittgenstein is not arguing for some ultimate illumination of life or philosophy, but for the realisation that we must proceed by looking at examples one by one, so that problems are solved and difficulties eliminated, not a single problem. Therefore the Investigations puts forward no theory (PI 109); we need rather to be wary of our forms of expression, which send us ‘in pursuit of chimeras’ when really ‘nothing extraordinary is involved’ (PI 94).

By identifying language-games we facilitate reading for translation. In a literary text, for example, a language-game may be being played that is not immediately obvious. Geoffrey Chaucer’s Middle English The Canterbury Tales includes a description of a Benedictine monk who is very fond of hunting:

(38)
1 He yaf nat of that text a pulled hen,
   he gave not of that text a plucked hen
2 That seith that hunters ben nat hooly men,
   that says that hunters be not holy men
3 Ne that a monk, when he is reccheless,
   nor that a monk when he is irresponsible
30 Reading the source text for translation

4 Is likened til a fissh that is waterlees,
   \[\textit{is like to a fish that is waterless}\]

5 This is to seyn, a monk out of his cloister.
   \[\textit{this is to say a monk out of his cloister}\]

6 But thilke text heeled he nat worth an oyster;
   \[\textit{but this text held he not worth an oyster}\]

7 And I seyde his opinion was good.
   \[\textit{and I said his opinion was good}\]

(1965:56)

Chaucer here is playing several language-games: describing somebody; reporting what was said; narrating a story; satirising a cleric. The final language-game is the key one to note when reading line 7. It is the point of Chaucer’s description of the monk, making the description an exercise in humour, not hagiography, for the monk is being praised for activities that betray his vocation. The depth grammar is the opposite of the surface grammar. The translator may note the techniques that have enabled these games to be played and decide to imitate them in his or her translation (Attridge 2004:75).

The language-game becomes clear when contextualised. As Wittgenstein remarks: ‘If someone says, “When I heard this word, it meant … to me”, he is referring to a point in time and to a way of using the word. (Of course, it is this combination that we fail to grasp.)’ (PPF 7).

Forms of life

Wittgenstein argues that human beings agree not in opinions but in form of life (PI 241), i.e. the way they live, so that language becomes ‘the conversation that is carried on with the characteristic activities of a form of life’ (Kerr 1988:30). To go shopping involves playing the language-game associated with that activity, to have a store of set phrases, expressions of politeness, items of vocabulary, transactional structures, etc. A game of football is played according to a certain kit of expressions. An item such as ‘handball’ is meaningless outside the form of life that is football, where players, apart from goalkeepers, may not use their hand to touch the ball; in many other sports, such as netball or rugby (or in everyday life), there is no offence in doing this. Wittgenstein stresses that he uses the term ‘language-game’ in order to emphasise that ‘the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life’ (PI 23), thus linking the two concepts through his characteristic emphasis on practice. In this section, I argue that to explore the concept of the form of life can help the translator who is reading for translation.

The meaning of words can be related to forms of life – for example, ‘dog’ can be used in different language-games depending on the form of life in question. Thus ‘dog’ can be used conventionally as a concrete noun or as a verb, but not as
an adjective or as an adverb. A reader who was confused by its occurrence in a sentence could look it up in a dictionary, but would need to recall the context in which the word occurred in order to find a fitting definition, so that care would have to be taken as to whether the source text used ‘dog’ as a verb or as a noun. In Table 2.1, a number of examples are given, all including the word ‘dog’. Each example consists of two sentences in order to make the context clear, with an explanation in the right-hand column.

The one word ‘dog’ has many uses. Wittgenstein advises his reader, when puzzled about a meaning, to think of how he or she learned the meaning of this word, from what sort of examples and in what sort of language-games, in order to see that a word (his example is ‘good’) must have a family of meanings (PI 77). Here he builds on the discussion of family resemblance from Investigations 66, as discussed in Chapter 1. There is no single ideal of exactness (PI 88), because language is a labyrinth of paths (PI 203).

In inviting his reader to think in this way, Wittgenstein points to a rich picture of speaker interaction. The point of talking about language-games is not merely to clear up cases of ambiguity. It is of course important to know, when Anna refers to ‘a mouse’, whether she is talking about a rodent or a piece of computer hardware; but Wittgenstein takes his reader much further than this, as is made clear by his linking of the language-game with the form of life. John Searle sums up:

\[(39)\] For the later Wittgenstein, all the criteria of meaning are ultimately social, not personal, and still less private. Words derive their meaning from the contexts in which they are used, and these in turn depend on social practices and thus ultimately on forms of living, forms of life.

\((in\ Magee\ 1987:339)\)

The word ‘dog’ in the examples in Table 2.1 is ultimately bound up with forms of life, with the fuzzy way that we use the word in so many more ways than to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| There is a dog in the kitchen.  
He is called Ben. | A barking domestic quadruped, i.e. a member of the genus *canis* and subspecies *canis lupus familiaris*, is in the kitchen. |
| Bad luck seems to dog me. I lost at cards last night again.  
You lucky dog. You won at cards, so I hear.  
He was as sick as a dog.  
Too much brandy.  
This choir is going to the dogs. The last concert was terrible. | I always seem to be unlucky.  
You were so fortunate.  
He vomited in a degrading way.  
This choir is in decline. |
Reading the source text for translation

TABLE 2.2 Forms of life from Table 2.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example</th>
<th>Form of Life</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There is a dog in the kitchen. He is called Ben.</td>
<td>Dogs are kept as pets and treated as family members, given names (often human ones, as here) and referred to by a masculine/feminine personal pronoun.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad luck seems to dog me. I lost at cards last night again.</td>
<td>Bad luck is given an animate form as a dog, an animal with tracking abilities. We tend to think in metaphors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You lucky dog. You won at cards, so I hear.</td>
<td>My envy leads me to dehumanise you, though the choice of a domesticated animal stops the image being too offensive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He was as sick as a dog. Too much brandy.</td>
<td>The mores of this society prohibit being sick in public and expect a self-control that we do not expect of dogs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This choir is going to the dogs. The last concert was terrible.</td>
<td>Dogs are regarded by most people as inferior to humans.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

designate the fuzzy animal in the corner, as illustrated in Table 2.2, which uses the same examples as Table 2.1 in the left-hand column and indicates possible forms of life in the right-hand column.

The examples in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 are typical of the sort of issue that translators face in their work. A translator would have to pay particular attention to the sentence ‘This choir is going to the dogs’, for example, as this could mean either that the choir was in decline or that the choristers were going off to the greyhound races. The sentence that follows – ‘The last concert was terrible’ – makes it clear which language-game is being played here. Translations often exhibit presumably unintended shifts in meaning when translators fail to look at the form of life. Willis Barnstone discusses a Spanish translation of a poem by Dylan Thomas in which the Argentine translator renders ‘she bore angels’ as ella aburrió a los angeles [she bored angels], and he concludes that this is not free interpretation of the English verb ‘to bear’ but a mistake, a rendering that is not at home in the language-games of the poem (1993:118).

Like anthropologists, translators face different forms of life in their work because their work crosses cultures and contexts. They need to be aware that there are different forms of life if they are to read successfully for translation. Wittgenstein criticises the anthropological work of James Frazer precisely because it fails to recognise such differences (‘Remarks on Frazer’s *Golden Bough*’ p. 125). In *The Golden Bough*, Frazer had described various rituals of so-called primitive peoples as being in error, and Wittgenstein notes that he has failed to see that a different form of life was in question:
What a narrow spiritual life on Frazer’s part! As a result: how impossible it was for him to conceive of a life different from that of the England of his time!

There is a failure of imagination. Frazer projects his own form of life onto the people he studies, so that Bosnian Turks are seen as making a mistake when they perform an adoption ritual that mimics the act of giving birth. As Wittgenstein comments: ‘it is surely insane to believe that an error is present and that [an adopting mother] believes that she has given birth to the child’ (‘Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough’ p. 125). Similarly, any translator must be aware of his or her own form of life and avoid seeing the other as merely a version of himself or herself. Wittgenstein goes on to criticise Frazer for viewing priests of other and earlier cultures as misguided Anglican parsons of the twentieth century.

Forms of life imply that there are factors that account for the production of any text, factors that are important for the translator to investigate. The translator of the New Testament, say, may research the theological and historical background to the source text in addition to reading it. The translator of a historical document may research the time in which it was written. Such research is necessary in order to be able to imagine the form of life behind a text.

Does this emphasis on what can account for a text contradict the earlier emphasis on meaning as a physiognomy? I do not think so, because appreciating a form of life is a necessary condition for meaning to function as a physiognomy. We need to ask why certain choices have been made. It is analogous to being in a foreign country, where knowledge of social mores may be of great help to a visitor, even to one who can speak the language, by facilitating communication (Lewis 1999). To appreciate music, according to Wittgenstein, it is necessary to learn the rules of music: learning the rules ‘actually changes your judgement’ (Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief p. 5). The same is true of translation. The form of life and the language-game are mutually enlightening. The translator as reader is now in a position to make a philosophical description, a surveyable representation of the text (see ‘Philosophical descriptions’ below).

Daniel Raveh describes what can go wrong if a translator fails to take forms of life into account when making such a description. In a discussion of translations of the Indian mystic Patañjali’s Sanskrit Yogasūtra, he notes that many translators of this sacred text into English have failed to recognise that translation is not just an ‘interlinguistic phenomenon’ but something that involves ‘transpositions of culture and thought’ (2008:169). Raveh argues that many contemporary translators of Patañjali ‘have suppressed or even defused the world-renunciation directives of this ancient philosophical text in their eagerness to project more moderate, palatable images of yoga to their anticipated audience in the west’ (2008:179). He surveys the translation of nirodha, for example, which could be translated as ‘stoppage’ or as ‘restriction’, and notes that only three of the ten translators in his sample opt for a view of yoga as a stoppage of mental activity; the other translators deradicalise the text by seeing nirodha merely as a form of restriction. Such choices in translation
serve to hide the asceticism that is at the heart of Patañjali’s approach. Raveh notes how one translation even links the source text to the science-fiction film franchise Star Wars. His conclusion is that the Yogasūtra has suffered ‘contamination’ in translation (2008:180).

A form of life may refer not just to a culture but also to a language. Different languages provide different ways of viewing the world. English does not have gendered articles, for example, unlike other European languages. In German, a noun is masculine, feminine or neuter, and shows its gender by the form of its article, so that ‘the fir tree’ is masculine, i.e. der Fichtenbaum, and ‘the palm tree’ is feminine, i.e. die Palme. Heinrich Heine is able to use the genders to suggest two trees being in love, in an untitled poem of 1856:

\[(41)\]

1 Ein Fichtenbaum steht einsam
   a fir-tree stands lonely
2 Im Norden auf kahler Höh.
   in-the north on bare height
3 Ihn schläfert; mit weißer Decke
   him slumbers with white blanket
4 Umbüllen ihn Eis und Schnee.
   surround him ice and snow
5 Er träumt von einer Palme,
   he dreams of a palm-tree
6 Die, fern im Morgenland,
   who far in-the orient
7 Einsam und schweigend trauert
   lonely and silently mourns
8 Auf brennender Felsenwand.
   on burning rock-wall

(1976:36)

Writing an interlinear gloss for the poem raises issues in translation. The third person singular pronoun er [he/it] in line 5 would usually be translated as ‘it’ when referring to a tree, but here ‘he’ seems a better choice because of the personification of the dreaming tree. Similarly, the relative pronoun die [who/which] in line 6 would usually be translated as ‘which’ when referring to a tree, but here ‘who’ seems a better choice because of the relationship between the trees that has now been constructed, and because einer Palme in line 5 is a feminine noun in the dative case. An English gloss cannot represent the gendered articles of the trees in lines 1 and 5. Gender is one way in which some languages must say certain things, as Roman Jakobson notes (2012:129). Heine is conditioned by the form of life of German, but
is able to use this constraint creatively in order to evoke an image of hopeless love as a language-game within the poem.

Factors such as gender may, as forms of life, make speakers of different languages perceive the world differently. The Sapir–Whorf hypothesis asserts that languages shape the way that their speakers see reality, so that the speakers of two different languages may not share a common point of view at all (Whorf 1956). Most current thinking rejects such hard determinism, but admits that language is one way in which we form reality, so that the gender of a noun, for example, may affect the way that the noun in question is perceived (Deutscher 2010:151). Jakobson reports a Russian child being astounded to see death depicted as an old man in a translation of German tales (2012:130). In German, ‘death’ is a masculine noun, *der Tod*; in Russian, it is a feminine noun, *smert’*, so that to a Russian reader death is ‘obviously a woman’ (2012:130). The language I use is part of my form of life and by becoming aware of my form of life I may be able to translate better because I am aware of how the way that I see the world is not how others see the world. The Russian child in Jakobson’s anecdote, for example, sees another aspect of the world by encountering a picture: people see concepts such as death differently in different cultures, so that a German speaker will naturally tend to personify death as a man; a Russian speaker will naturally tend to personify death as a woman. When I translate, I should not impose my own form of life on that of the source text. Many marketing campaigns have failed because advertisers have not taken account of cultural differences. One pharmaceutical company, for example, commissioned a series of pictures, to be read from left to right, in order to show how a medicine should be taken. This strategy failed with Arabic customers, who read from right to left; the company had not realised that the pictures themselves would need to undergo a form of translation (Humphrey et al. 2011:np).

Awareness of how language forms reality is an important intercultural skill. Richard Lewis describes how different languages make people see cultural interaction differently, so that for an English-speaker to demand ‘fair play’ is meaningless if he or she addresses somebody whose culture has no tradition of organised games and has no term for ‘fair play’ in his or her language (1999:15). The point can be extended to the translator who is reading for translation, because awareness of forms of life – which are varied yet ultimately human practices – can make the translator aware of both the difficulties and the possibilities of translation. John Searle asserts that it is local cultural factors that make activities such as translation difficult, while the shared ‘Deep Background’ we have as human beings makes them possible (2011:122). (He refers to ‘Deep Background’, where Wittgenstein would use ‘form of life’, as that which is necessary for human beings to function socially: to do something like attend an academic conference depends on a lot of shared know-how.) A similar point is made by David Bellos, who argues that translation can take place because we are all different and yet all the same (2011:338).

People can understand forms of life because of the nature of the human body, which, as Searle notes, means that there is a common human form of life; this is the view on which cognitive linguistics is based (Lakoff and Johnson 2003) and gives us
a further reason for looking at Wittgenstein, who offers support for and elucidation of such views. According to Wittgenstein, if a lion could talk, we would not be able to understand it (PPF 327). The reason for this, as Gordon Baker and Peter Hacker point out, is not because a lion would not speak clearly but because the form of life accessible to lions is too far removed from our form of life for anything that a lion said to count as sense: talking lions in fantasy, such as the cowardly lion in the film The Wizard of Oz, are blends of the human and the leonine (2009:73). Lions as they really are do not speak, of course: the phenomenon of language, and its investigation in the Investigations, is necessarily both anthropological and anthropic.

Current research in linguistics and neuroscience supports Wittgenstein’s approach. Anna Wierzbicka, writing in linguistics, notes that cultures differ markedly in the vocabularies they employ, but that there exist lexical universals that allow languages to be compared (and, by inference, translated). For example, different languages have unique lexical items referring to types of food: Polish has a special word for plum jam, powidła, which English does not, whereas English has a special word, ‘marmalade’, for an orange (or orange-like) jam, which Polish does not (1997:2). However, both languages have concepts for at least sixty ‘universal semantic primitives’, such as the attributes ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘big’ and ‘small’ (1997:26). Points of similarity allow points of difference to be appreciated: different types of jam can be compared because the languages share evaluative concepts. Writing in neuroscience, David Robson notes that recent research has overturned the view of the body as a vehicle driven by the brain, replacing it with a view of a partnership between brain and body (2011). This view of the person is in line with Wittgenstein’s non-dualistic approach to human identity. Such support from outside philosophy is further warrant for using Wittgenstein’s methods within translation studies to describe what translation does and as a tool for practice.

**Philosophical descriptions**

In the German review Das Magazin, June 2009, a cartoon by Adam on page 83 depicts three men sitting in a room. One man is speaking and his words are cited as example (42), followed by my translation as (43):

(42) Hallo, ich bin Tom und ich freue mich so sehr, hier zu sein.

   hello   I   am Tom and I   rejoice myself so much here to be

(43) Hello, I am Tom and I am so very pleased to be here.

What makes Tom’s words at least potentially funny is the clash between his conventionally polite speech, which expresses pleasure at where he is, and its context, as shown in the cartoon. His body language is that of a man resigned to a terrible fate. Of the other two men in the image, one seems bored and the other seems irritated. On the open door are the words ANONYME SARKASTEN [anonymous sarcasms]. The context makes the meaning clear. Sarcasm is a language-game, just as
Wittgenstein holds that lying is a language-game (*PI* 249). The form of life is that of the contemporary West, where addiction to drugs, alcohol, etc. has become common, so that self-help groups proliferate, and Adam is playing with the fantasy of a self-help group for those addicted to sarcasm. In context, the words of the speaker, precisely through their surface grammar of formal politeness, perfectly express the depth grammar, i.e. the language-game of the addict who is far from over addiction. Such insights would be of use to anybody engaged in translating Adam’s cartoon. The translator might choose, for example, to reference vocabulary associated with self-help groups in the target culture, for example translating *ANONYME SARKASTEN* as *SARCSTICS ANONYMOUS*, reversing the position of adjective and noun in line with the UK organisation Alcoholics Anonymous.

The use of Wittgensteinian tools can therefore elucidate a text, in this case a cartoon. The end to which they are used is that of the philosophical description. In *Investigations* 109, Wittgenstein asserts that the task of philosophy is one of description, which should be seen in the greater context of how Wittgenstein approaches phenomena, i.e. through the grammatical investigation: ‘our inquiry is therefore a grammatical one’ (*PI* 90). The grammatical investigation is a tool in Wittgenstein’s battle against what he sees as our bewitchment by language (*PI* 109), and he undertakes grammatical investigations of many terms, such as ‘expectation’ (*PI* 434−45) or ‘negation’ (*PI* 446–8). As Marie McGinn asserts, his method has two purposes (2008:14): first, he shows the dichotomy between our idea of how we believe that a concept works and the way that it works in practice; second, he shows the many different ways in which a concept can be used. In his investigation of expectation, for example, he presents the term as having a linguistic rather than an essentialist function (*PI* 445), and also as a term that has various uses in the ways that people speak (*PI* 444). Concepts are examined as to how they function. The goal is the description, the surveyable representation (*PI* 122), which by its nature is an ongoing task, undertaken criss-cross, like the *Investigations* itself, which constantly approaches language from new angles (*PI* p. 3).

Wittgenstein’s methods can be used to form a philosophical approach for the description of the source text, which is a necessary task for any translator. It may be objected that there can be no such thing as an objective description of a text. To ask two people to describe an incident may result in two very different descriptions, while somebody who has never seen a duck will only ever recognise the rabbit in Joseph Jastrow’s image (Figure 2.1). How then can we proceed? Wittgenstein’s approach is summed up in *Investigations* 79:

(44) Should it be said that I’m using a word whose meaning I don’t know, and so am talking nonsense? – Say what you please, so long as it does not prevent you seeing how things are. (And when you see that, there will be some things that you won’t say.)

We are constrained by the facts, but within this constraint we have great freedom. To be sure, the notion of a fact is not straightforward. Derek Attridge notes
the problems involved when choosing which aspects of any work can count as facts to be described – for example, should the typeface of a book be mentioned (2004:156)? As Wittgenstein remarks: ‘Nothing is so difficult as doing justice to the facts’ (‘Remarks on Frazer’s *Golden Bough*’ p. 129). Following Wittgenstein, however, the word ‘fact’ must be seen in relation to how it is used (*PI* 43). There is no objective notion of the fact to which we can appeal, but we can look at practices. In *Investigations* 48, Wittgenstein imagines a ‘sentence’ with the following arrangement, where R, G, W and B represent ‘red’, ‘green’, ‘white’ and ‘black’ respectively:

\[(45)\] RRBGGGRWW

How could this sentence be described? Wittgenstein remarks:

\[(46)\] Well, does the sentence consist of four letters or nine? – And which are its elements, the type of letter, or the letters? Does it matter which we say, so long as we avoid misunderstandings in any particular case?

To say that there are four letters in example (45) makes sense, but it is not wrong to say that it contains nine letters. Everything depends on what we mean by ‘letter’ in this particular case. Hans-Joachim Glock comments that for Wittgenstein one cannot point at a fact, only point out a fact (1996:120). What is true or false is what human beings say, because agreement is to be found in forms of life (*PI* 241). Thus a translator may decide not to mention the typeface of a news report or a legal report, but may decide that the typeface ought to be mentioned when describing an advertisement or a Reformation Bible, to answer Attridge’s question above (2004:156).

Brian Magee refers to the misconception of Wittgenstein adopting an ‘anything goes’ attitude: ‘He did not think we can use language how we like and then claim meaning or validity for our utterances on equal terms with anyone else’s’ (1987:335). In example (46), Wittgenstein insists that if we look at the facts then there will be certain things that we will not say – for example, that there are twenty letters in example (45). The meaning of the word (or of the sentence or of the text) is to be looked for in utterance and in the human practices that sustain it. The worst that can happen, as Peter Hacker explains, is that one person may find that he or she is using words differently from somebody else, but in that case the different uses can be explained and work can carry on (2007a:105).

As well as describing facts about texts, we can describe how texts are used, i.e. the depth grammar. Again there can be no objective procedure. In *Zettel* [fragments] 235, for example, Wittgenstein remarks how a timetable can be interpreted in various ways, even if somebody may not be aware of this as he or she uses it in one particular way. (A future historian may read a bus timetable as a source of information about twenty-first-century forms of life, while a local councillor may analyse it in order to back up an argument about the need for better services; a
student, however, may use it to work out when the next bus to the university is due, without worrying about these possibilities.) The translator who notes facts about a text that he or she can maintain in a translation may therefore also be able to maintain the depth grammar of a work in translation. If I pay attention to the physiognomy of the source text when I translate, then readers of the target text will be able to use it in ways that are analogous to the ways in which the source text is used, like Wittgenstein’s example of the timetable. The Bible, for example, is a text that is frequently interpreted, and scholars working in different languages are able to work within the same interpretive fields because the translations of the Bible that they use can be mapped on to each other. Wittgenstein refers to interpretation as stepping from one level to another (Zettel 234), but such a move is only possible once the facts have been laid out.

The later Wittgenstein looks at human practices, one of which is the reading of texts, addressed in Investigations 652:

(47) ‘He sized him up with a hostile glance and said …’ The reader of the story understands this; and he has no doubt in his mind. Now you say: ‘Very well, he supplies the meaning, he guesses it.’ – Generally speaking, he supplies nothing, guesses nothing.

Wittgenstein is not saying that the opening words have to be taken as the final statement on what is happening in the story – he goes on to note that the character’s hostility may be a pretence – nor does he (I assume) want to stop readers of detective fiction guessing who committed the murder. As Sonia Sedivy asserts, he shows that ‘a text presents an immediate meaning just as a face presents an immediate expression’ (2004:166). The translator can concentrate on identifying this immediate meaning (which may of course be puzzling or ambiguous) and considering how it may be rendered for the reader who does not command the source language.

Wittgenstein opposes what Ray Monk calls the ‘idol-worship of science’, i.e. the assumption that it is possible to discover the truth about all phenomena by applying set procedures (1990:416). There may be procedures in calculus, but not in philosophy, which leads Wittgenstein to a stance against theory in the sense of systematisation. For Wittgenstein, the investigation of the particular case has to come first, and to perform such an investigation is the limited but demanding task of philosophy. Description is a human activity that varies from case to case. It is not objective, but can nonetheless be rigorous.

Applying Wittgenstein

I give three extended examples of how Wittgenstein can be applied to reading the source text for translation. The examples chosen are limited by space, and necessarily reflect my own interests and translation background, but I hope that they can be seen as exemplifying the application of Wittgenstein.
In making use of Wittgenstein’s terms, there is a danger of falling into what Rupert Read calls the ‘technicalisation and jargonalisation of what … must above all be an activity, a set of methods’ (2004:85). I hope to avoid this danger, though the genre of the academic study involves a necessary referencing of Wittgensteinian tools. A clue to procedure is to be found in the book of essays *The Danger of Words* by Maurice Drury (1973), which has been described by Monk as ‘perhaps, in its tone and concerns, the most truly Wittgensteinian work ever published by any of Wittgenstein’s students’ (1990:264). What is noteworthy is that Wittgenstein is rarely referred to in Drury’s essays (although the intellectual debt is fully acknowledged in the Preface). Drury simply submits psychological terms to grammatical analysis by examining how they are used and by showing how this use causes confusion in the practice of psychiatry. I think that translation after Wittgenstein can proceed in a similar way. Wittgenstein would be mentioned as a source and then applied (as in Tymoczko 2007). In *Tractatus* 6.54, Wittgenstein writes that his thoughts are like a ladder that must be thrown away once it has been climbed. The point of turning to Wittgenstein is to be able to use his methods like a ladder in order to be able to ascend to a new position.

**Reading literature for translation**

Wolfgang Huemer asserts that for Wittgenstein meanings are not in the head, but in ‘words anchored in social practice and physical environment’ (2004:7). One such practice is literature, and here I investigate poetry. In a Wittgensteinian sense, poetry is ‘a language-game governed by its own conventions’ that puts an emphasis on such formal features as rhyme and rhythm, so that the reader has to be able to notice certain aspects (Huemer 2004:9). For Joachim Schulte, ‘certain insights articulated in the context of [Wittgenstein’s] later philosophy can … assist us in our attempts to understand what it means to come to grips with or master the content of a poem’ (2004:146).

Example (48) is taken from the Old High German poem *Das Hildebrandslied* [the song of Hildebrand], forming lines 49–57 of the extant text (in Müller 2007:31). The speaker is Hildebrand, a warrior fated to kill in single combat his son Hadubrand, whom he addresses here. The sole surviving manuscript of the poem has been dated to 800, though the poem’s events are set in the fifth century and the poem can be placed in the Indo-European heroic tradition (West 2009:442). Caesuras are indicated by forward slashes.

(48)

1 welaga nu, waltant got, / wewurt skihit.  
   alas now powerful God ill-fate happens

2 ih wallota sumaro enti wintro / sehstic ur lante,  
   *I travelled summer and winter sixty out-of land*

3 dar man mih eo scerita / in folc sceotantero:  
   *there one me always placed in folk of-warriors*
4 so man mir at burc -messages / banun ni giftast,
so one to-me at town any bane not seized

5 nu scal mih suasat chind / suertu hauwan,
now shall me own child with-sword hit

6 breton mit sinu billiu, / eddo ih imo ti banin werdan.
cut-down with his blade or I to-him to bane become

7 doh maht du nu aodlihho, / ibu dir din ellen taoc,
but may you now easily if to-you your courage is-valid

8 in sus heremo man / hrusti giwinnan,
in thus old man armour win

9 rauba birahanen, / ibu du dar enic reht habes.
prize gain if you there any right have

I have given the source text an interlinear gloss, following good practice in translation studies, in order to enable an English-speaking reader without knowledge of Old High German to be able to work out what is going on. In addition, example (49) is my plain prose translation of the poem. Written in grammatical English, it is based on the translation choices made in the gloss and again aims to offer the reader insight into what is going on, without itself functioning as a poem.

(49) But alas, powerful God, an ill fate is coming about. I travelled for sixty summers and winters out of the land; there I was always placed among the warriors, and death did not seize me at any town. Now my own child shall hit me with his sword, cut me down with his blade – or I shall be death to him. But you may now easily, if you are a brave man, win the armour from such an old man and gain the prize, if you have any right to it.

Glosses, whether in the form of interlinear cribs or of plain prose translations, function as surveyable representations because they enable the reader to form an overview of a translation situation and to make connections between source and target text. In the language-game of poetry translation, however, translators usually produce a target text that can also function independently of the source text as a poem, and, in Chapter 3, I offer a poetic translation of the section of the Hildebrandslied discussed here.

Wittgenstein notes that poems may appear to be about transmitting information, because they are inevitably written in the language of information, but that information transmission is not the purpose of the language-game of poetry (Zettel 160): the impressions that poems make on their readers go beyond that (Zettel 170). Schulte explains that Wittgenstein is saying here that poetry, ‘even though it employs the same building-blocks as ordinary (“prosaic”) speech, is subject to different conventions from those regulating the manifold kinds of uses of language which serve to impart information and to communicate facts’ (2004:154). Such conventions are summed up by Wittgenstein in Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology II 501:
But now you remember certain sensations and images and thoughts as you read, and they are such as were not irrelevant for the enjoyment, for the impression. – But I should like to say that they get their correctness only from their surroundings: through the reading of this poem, from my knowledge of the language, with its metre and with innumerable other things. (These eyes smile only in this face and in this temporal context.)

The final reference to physiognomy stresses that meaning is on the surface, that it lies in the choices made by the author, and in the language-games played as a consequence. What is important is to learn how to read the surface. Wittgenstein uses his own reading of the German poet Friedrich Klopstock (who wrote unrhymed verse with intricate metrical patterns) to illustrate the phenomenon, describing how, when he finally read Klopstock with a stress on the metre, he was able to say, ‘A-ha, now I know why he did this’ (Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief p. 4). Such an experience, what Wittgenstein refers to as ‘A-ha’, is the becoming aware of the style, of seeing that form and content are inseparable. Previously Wittgenstein had felt bored by Klopstock, but was now able to appreciate the poetry by seeing it in a new way.

A Wittgensteinian reading of the Hildebrandslied would therefore stress: the poem’s meaning as its physiognomy; the language-games being played there; the form of life on which the language-games depend. In terms of formal features, the following aspects might dawn on a reader: the use of alliteration as a binding technique, as in the repetition of initial ‘w’ in line 1, i.e. welaga, waltant and wewurt; the caesura dividing each line; the absence of rhyme; the juxtaposition of an invocation of God in line 1 with an awareness that fate is in charge in welaga nu, waltant got, / wewurt skihit; the shift between Hildebrand’s dramatic monologue in lines 1–6 and his address to the other combatant, i.e. his son Hadubrand, in lines 7–9. This laying-out of facts is in line with Wittgenstein’s stress on description (PI 124). The human form of life depicted in the poem is one we can still recognise, because we can shiver as Hildebrand laments to God that a wicked fate is working itself out that will force him to kill the son who does not recognise him.

The difference between the poem’s language and of form of life and my own language and form of life in 2015 will make translation difficult; but such shared forms of life and pain-behaviour will make translation possible (Searle 2011) because the same language-games can be played. A reading of Wittgenstein in the context of poetry again shows that words are things with which we operate (PI 1) rather than entities to which meaning adheres, which allows interesting questions to be asked about poetry translation. How could we operate with one of the oldest poems in German by using the voice of a contemporary English-speaker? How could the poem’s formal features influence the translation? How could it be placed in dialogue with other poems? What happens if Wittgenstein’s contention that meaning is a physiognomy (PI 568) is taken seriously? Translation becomes an exercise in anthropology. The translator must forsake the crystalline beauty of the world
of the *Tractatus*, where translating from one language to another would be a matter of substitution, an exercise in calculus (*TL-P* 3.343), for the ‘rough ground’ of the world of the *Investigations*, where meaning has to be investigated case by case in the everyday world of transaction (*PI* 107). Douglas Robinson applies Wittgenstein’s instruction to look for the meaning of a word in its use (*PI* 43) to translation, arguing that a ‘person-centred approach to any text, language or culture will always be more productive than a focus on abstract linguistic structures or cultural conventions’ because the translator needs to be aware of the anthropology behind any utterance (2003:112). What would the people in the *Hildebrandslied* – both the characters and the narrator – say in translation? How could the anonymous voices that composed this poem still speak through Hildebrand? Such questions indicate a turn from reading the source text for translation to writing the target text, the topic of Chapter 3.

**Reading theology for translation**

Here I use the Hellenistic Greek New Testament as an example of theology. There are many aspects of the New Testament, but I follow Andrew T. Lincoln in seeing the theological aspect as the most important (2005:1). In investigating a text, I show how the consideration of surface grammar and depth grammar can help the reflective practitioner of translation, in line with Wittgenstein’s epistemological instruction that meaning can be found by examining use (*PI* 43).

In *Investigations* 373, Wittgenstein makes the following comment:

(51) Grammar tells us what kind of object anything is. (Theology as grammar.)

By examining the grammar of the New Testament, we can encounter its theology and become better placed to translate it. John 19:30 describes Jesus’s death by crucifixion. The Hellenistic Greek in example (52) follows Aland et al. (1968):

(52) hote oun     elaben to oxos   [ho]    Iesous eipen,  
*when therefore received the vinegar* [the] *Jesus he-said*

Tetelestai:        kai     klinas       tên kephalên paredôken to    pneuma.  
*it-has-been-finished and reclining the head*   *he-gave-up the spirit*

The surface grammar is a simple narrative account of four actions: Jesus drank vinegar; he said that it was over; he bowed his head; he died. My translation in (53) therefore appears to be satisfactory, because it represents these actions:

(53) So when Jesus had taken the vinegar, he said: ‘It is finished’. And, bowing his head, he died.

Or should the final clause be translated as ‘he gave up the ghost’? This translation would both document the Greek and replicate the *King James Bible* rendering,
which has become a standard (although possibly facetious) expression for dying. The question seems to be one of stylistic choice and nothing more.

Attention to the way the Greek is written, however, shows that other aspects have not been taken into account in this reading, i.e. the implications of the verbs Tetelestai and paredôken. The first verb often has a purposive sense, a sense of fulfilment, consonant with the stress throughout the whole of John’s Gospel on how Jesus, as Word of God, is in control of events, foreseeing his death as something planned (John 10:18), so that the crucifixion can be seen as a glorification, and his final word as a cry not of abandonment but of victory (Lincoln 2005:478). The second verb can also mean ‘hand over’, hence Jesus could be said here to be handing over the Holy Spirit to the Church. It is a question of reading the text with a view to the form of life that produced it, what Nicholas King calls ‘the kind of life that lurks beneath the text of the New Testament’ (2004:12). Here is King’s rendering of the source text:

(54) And when he had taken the vinegar, Jesus said, ‘It is perfected’. And inclining his head, he handed over the Spirit.

(2004)

King brings out the theological implications and enables the reader to construct the depth grammar, even if Jesus’s death is implied rather than stated. His translation retains theology as grammar.

**Reading non-literary texts for translation**

If reading a poem or theology for translation is demanding, as shown in the previous two sections, then reading a non-literary text might be thought to be easy, a simple identification of the information that is to be transferred. Translation is often divided into the literary and the non-literary (Barnstone 1993:4), but the division is problematic because any attempt to define literature is problematic (Hermans 2007b:78–9). The New Testament, traditionally considered to be a theological, non-literary text, can be read in a literary way (Keefer 2008), for example, and Christine Calfoglou (2014) demonstrates how stylistic features (such as iconicity) are potentially inherent in all text types, which means that the Wittgensteinian grammatical investigation can be carried out on any source text, not just on literature or theology. The situation lacks clear boundaries.

Writing in the Yorkshire magazine *Dalesman*, Ali Schofield describes her meeting with ethical entrepreneur Isobel Davies under this headline:

(55) Where there’s a wool, there’s a way.

(2014:47)

To investigate this headline grammatically involves matching it against the common English proverb ‘Where there’s a will, there’s a way’ and noting how the
successful production of fashionable woollen clothing is blended with the refusal to slaughter for meat the sheep used for the production of wool. The headline thus indicates somebody who has come up with an unusual solution in a particular context. We have a play on words, which must be recognised as such, and, when necessary, translated as such, which I discuss in Chapter 3. The headline only makes sense in the context of the article and within the form of life of ethical entrepreneurship in woollen fashion; by itself it is puzzling and functions as an encouragement to the reader to proceed with the article in order to solve the puzzle.

Forms of life, in other words, are crucial when reading non-literary texts for translation. The translator needs to examine the forms of life of both source and target cultures. Jean Boase-Beier argues, for example, that if an advertisement for cars is to be translated then it is more likely to be the home market that ‘determines how the car in question is viewed and therefore how the advertisement is translated’ (2011:52). Reading an advertisement for translation involves more than looking at the information. In this context, a translator would need to be aware of the form of life of the home market for cars. Advertisements for Volkswagen cars typically keep the motto Das Auto [the car] in translated advertisements in order to highlight the car’s German origins, which are typically perceived by target markets as of high quality. In Brazil, however, this strategy failed, because Brazil had been producing Volkswagen Beetle cars for years under the Portuguese slogan Você conhece, você confia [you know, you trust], and retaining the German slogan was seen as offensive (Humphrey et al. 2011:np). Similarly, David Bellos describes journalists taking the ‘plain information’ of news reports in a source language and turning them into ‘arresting, entertaining or readable prose suited to the culture, interests and knowledge of the people who read them’, a process going beyond common notions of translation, while the journalists in question would not think of themselves as translators (2011:252). The forms of life determine how translation is done.

Wittgenstein’s stress on practice can also be used to discern what qualifies as the source text. Translation studies has traditionally focused on written source texts (Tymoczko 2006:17). Wittgenstein’s later work, however, largely deals with spoken language. In Investigations 243, for example, he imagines human beings who speak only in monologue, and describes how an explorer who watches them and listens to their talk might succeed in translating their language. The explorer would then be able to predict what people are going to do, because he can hear them making resolutions and decisions. This approach would support the way that the field of translation studies is being expanded to include many forms of translating and interpretation. In his analysis of film and translation, for example, Michael Cronin investigates interpretation as well as translation, and describes Sofia Coppola’s presentation of the Japanese interpreter in her film Lost in Translation (2009:81).

Reading a non-literary text, then, is more complex than might be thought, and certainly more complex than preparing for the solely ‘semantic transfer’ with which Antoine Berman categorises non-literary translation (2012:241). Paulo Oliveira views the polarity of literary and non-literary as incompatible with Wittgenstein’s later work (2012:166). After Wittgenstein, the standard generic opposition between
the literary text and the non-literary text can fall away. A text is literary not because of its genre but because of the way that its language can be used. An advertisement, for example, can display literary language, through such techniques as alliteration, and can be said to have a literary function if this is the case (Boase-Beier 2011:21). A poem can fail to display literary language by not making any demands on its reader and can fail to have a literary function. There is a larger debate to be had here, as clearly it often makes practical sense to refer to two types of translation (Chesterman and Wagner 2002:5), but it can at least be said that when reading the non-literary text for translation, Wittgenstein’s instruction in *Investigations* 66 is still relevant: ‘don’t think, but look!’.

**Conclusions**

‘How should I translate?’. The answer to this question is to point out that translation is a practice and that this practice begins with reading, i.e. reading for translation. If John Berger is right to assert that what we see is affected by what we know (1977:8), then it follows that a knowledge of Wittgenstein will enable a reader to see the text as a physiognomy and to be freed from the (probably unconscious) paradigm of decoding. Wittgenstein stresses that what must be overcome are not difficulties of the intellect but of the will (CI’ p. 25).

My claim is not that a reading of Wittgenstein will produce perfect translators and perfect translations. Any such claim would view translation as a scientific procedure analogous to a calculus, a view alien to the later Wittgenstein. To use Wittgenstein is a philosophical way of describing the processes of reading for translation. There are other ways available: the sociological, the cognitive, the literary, the psychological, etc. Nor do I wish to suggest that using Wittgenstein means that we cannot use the insights of other philosophers.

Any way of describing a process is bound in turn to become part of that process. By using Wittgenstein, it is possible to acquire what he calls ‘new conceptual glasses’ (*Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology* I 94). This is not to suggest that to use Wittgenstein is necessary for translation. The existence of successful translations written before the publication of the *Investigations* in 1953 is sufficient to dismiss that notion. My claim is rather that the story told by Wittgenstein in his later work is too important for practitioners and theorists of translation to ignore, because he offers a perspective on language that can enable the task of reading for translation to be approached with clarity.

**Note**

1 Thanks to Catherine Rowett for this term.